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While Craig’s relationship to, and emergence from, the French legal humanist tradition 
has always been widely recognised, this paper constitutes a deeper analysis of the 
specific threads connecting Craig to the humanist literature of the sixteenth century. It 
examines the first chapter to the Jus feudale and, by studying Craig’s aetiology of law 
and society, assesses the literary and cultural influences on his historiographical 
product. It will demonstrate that Craig’s understanding of the earliest human society 
and of law’s evolution was highly dependent on continental humanist literature and, 
above all, on the writings of Jean Bodin. Yet it will also show that Craig was capable 
of independent thought and rigorous critical analysis of sources. We will see Craig’s 
relationship to the writings of his fellow Scot and humanist, George Buchanan, whose 
De jure regni apud Scotos constitutes a vital intertextual frame for many aspects of 
Craig’s thought, particularly as it relates to sovereignty, monarchy and the limits of 
royal power. Moreover, we will see that the first chapter, though seemingly an 
antiquarian digression, actually reflects Craig’s thoughts on many significant political 
issues that were current in Scotland at the time he was writing. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
To most modern readers, Thomas Craig is, first and foremost, ‘a busy and successful 
lawyer’,1 an active advocate whose rôle in the Scottish legal profession of his day was 
sufficiently influential that his death was recorded in the Session’s books of sederunt in 
                                                 
1 J. W. Cairns, ‘The Breve Testatum and Craig’s Jus Feudale’, 56 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 
(1988) 311-332 at 314; see also J. W. Cairns, T. D. Fergus, and H. L. MacQueen, ‘Legal Humanism in 
Renaissance Scotland’, 11 Journal of Legal History (1990), 41-69 at 48 and J. Finlay, ‘The Early Career 
of Thomas Craig, Advocate’, 8 Edinburgh Law Review (2004), 298-328 at 298-299. 
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‘an unprecedented and unique addition to the formal court record’.2 Like many jurists 
of his time, however, Craig was also an unambiguously literary man who produced a 
significant quantity of Latin verse. While his poetry was, aesthetically speaking, not 
quite on a par with Buchanan, it nevertheless has significant literary merit in its own 
right and has been preserved in the Delitiae poetarum Scotorum,3 a compendium which 
has, in recent years, begun to receive a degree of attention from scholars of Scottish 
Renaissance humanism. 
 
The nature of modern academic culture is such that it seems perfectly natural to 
distinguish between Craig the lawyer and Craig the poet. In his own time, however, any 
such division would have been incomprehensible. As early as 1915, Baird Smith was 
aware that modern conceptions of the lawyer’s proper sphere had led to the imposition 
of anachronistic interpretational dichotomies which would have seemed, at the very 
least, unusual to Craig and his contemporaries.4 Renaissance jurists like Craig admitted 
no artificial distinction between their literary and legal output;5 indeed, one of the 
defining characteristics of legal humanism was its conception of law as something that 
had to be understood in literary and historical terms.6 Even Craig’s magnum opus, the 
Jus feudale, is a text which does not fit solely within the category of law. While the text 
is arguably the first, and certainly least studied, of the Scottish institutional texts,7 it is 
not only a legal (or legal-historical)8 document but also a very significant piece of 
Scottish Latin literature with great value in the philosophical, political and 
historiographical spheres and one which is heavily informed by a wide variety of 
sources, both classical and contemporary. 
 
Craig was, as all writers are, a product of his own time, place and culture. During 
his lifetime, Craig was neither an Institutional writer nor the father of Scots legal 
historiography; these are labels appended to him subsequently, labels which would have 
been incomprehensible to him and which, in many ways, prevent us from understanding 
him as he and his contemporaries would have. While he lived he was, and saw himself 
as, a French-trained humanist lawyer,9 a title which, in sixteenth-century Scotland, 
made implicit that Craig was a literary figure as much as a legal one and that his literary 
                                                 
2 On the recording of Craig’s death, see J. W. Cairns, ‘Thomas Craig (?1538-1608)’, Oxford Dictionary 
of National Biography, Oxford, 2004. 
3 Cf. Vita Cragii, xvii (1732 edition). 
4 D. Baird Smith, ‘Sir Thomas Craig, Feudalist’, 12 Scottish Historical Review (1915), 271-302 at 275 
and 291. 
5 Cf. J. D. Ford, Law and Opinion in Scotland during the Seventeenth Century, Portland, 2007, 50. 
6 C. P. Rodgers, ‘Humanism, History and the Common Law’, 6 Journal of Legal History (1985), 129-
156 at 129. 
7 Cairns, ‘Breve Testatum’, 312 calls it ‘the first comprehensive treatise on early modern Scots law to be 
published’. 
8 Even in Stair’s day, some forty years after Burnet first published the work and about ninety years after 
it was written, the Jus feudale was outdated in some substantial ways and constituted a voice from a 
distant past rather than a work of living law; see Stair, Institutions, 2.3.3. 
9 Craig was not unique; see Cairns, Fergus & MacQueen, ‘Legal Humanism’, 44 on Skene, Craig’s 
contemporary, who was taught according to the mos docendi Gallicus at Wittenberg University; with 
this term, Skene was describing the utilisation of classics and the liberal arts as a ‘systematic method of 
study’ (Rodgers, ‘Humanism’, 131) as laid out by Alciato and his students at the University of Bourges; 
legal humanism was marked by ‘the use of philological and historical methods of enquiry as a way of 
recovering...ancient Roman law’ and stood in contrast to the mos Italicus of the earlier legal 
commentators (Ford, Law and Opinion, 9). Cf. G. Dolezalek, Scotland under the Jus Commune, 3 vols., 
Edinburgh, 2010, vol.1, 6 on the deep French influence over Scots law in the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries.  
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output, including the Jus feudale, was an expression of a humanist cultural nexus that 
centred on and derived from the law schools and universities of France; as Cairns puts 
it, ‘Appreciation of this French, humanist influence is vital in interpreting and 
understanding Jus Feudale’.10 
 
However, the other components of Craig’s identity – his nationality and his 
profession – were no less important and, along with his humanist French education, 
form the foundational elements of his literary product. We can read his first chapter on 
each of these three levels: first as a lawyer’s introduction to the concept and origin of 
law; second as a humanist’s classicising explanation of human prehistory; and third as 
a Scotsman’s effort at using the ancient past to illustrate and interpret the hard political 
realities of the times in which he lived. 
 
This essay is a first attempt at locating and interpreting the author and his 
literary-cultural relationships to sources through his aetiology of human prehistory, as 
recounted in the first chapter of the Jus feudale. As such, it is literary, even hermeneutic, 
in nature. By close study of the Latin text, it will endeavour to show how Craig’s 
narrative was shaped by the sources he used. As we shall see, he employed a wide 
variety of sources, ancient and contemporary, verse and prose, sacred and profane, and 
by recognising them we may begin to trace the flow of ideas that passed from sources 
to writer thence to readers. If, as literary critics so often claim, writers write in response 
to the pressure of earlier writers, Craig would seem to encapsulate the matter very 
neatly. His entire aetiology of law and society is an expression of the sources he used 
and the cultural milieu in which he lived and was educated.11 
  
 
II. STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN THE INITIAL CHAPTERS OF JUS 
FEUDALE 
 
When Craig set out to form a detailed history of feudal law, he began with the biblical 
narrative of the Tower of Babel. He explained how the earliest societies, laws and 
governments were formed in the days after the Fall of Man before going on to discuss 
state and citizenship, the creation of monarchy, the rise of tyranny (quite the hot topic 
in the Scotland of his day), the inception of written law and, finally, the origin of Greek 
and Roman law, with which the first chapter concludes. In the second and third 
chapters, he goes on to discuss the origin and rise of civil and canon law respectively. 
                                                 
10 Cairns, ‘Breve Testatum’, 316. According to J. Pocock, The ancient constitution and the feudal law, 
Cambridge, 1957, 79, Craig studied in Paris 1555 to 1561 and was taught by François Baudouin but such 
a contention goes far beyond the evidence. We know that Craig studied in Paris as a youth (as Cairns 
notes, citing a line from the De unione regnorum Britanniae) and we can say that this French sojourn 
must have taken place after his graduation from St Andrews in 1555 but that is the limit of our knowledge. 
Cairns observes that the language Craig uses in describing his time in Paris is such that we cannot even 
say with certainty that he studied law there. Specifically, Craig speaks of studying litterae which 
‘strongly suggests he there exclusively studied arts’ (note, however, that Cicero uses the word to mean 
‘edicts’ or ‘ordinances’, In Verrem 2.5.56, so it is not impossible that Craig was using the word as a 
synonym for ‘laws’); certainly, Craig must have been exposed to a great many French humanists, many 
of whom he would later cite in the Jus feudale and who constitute ‘his intellectual, if not actual, mentors’ 
(Cairns, Fergus & MacQueen, ‘Legal Humanism’, 48). 
11 The author is conscious of the danger of lapsing into New Historicist territory and presenting Craig 
as an impersonal, bourgeois scribe jotting down the cultural creation of the society in which he lived. 
That is not the intent. 
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The material in these three chapters is not perhaps germane to the reader seeking 
detailed information on the rules governing feudal investiture in early modern Scotland, 
but it should nevertheless be abundantly clear that these chapters express a great deal 
about Craig’s conceptualisation of law, its purpose, origins, development and 
relationship to other social structures and to historical events. They could be said to 
represent a diorama of the philosophical and intellectual abstractions that underlie 
Craig’s approach to the practice of law. At a philosophical level, Craig understood 
history as a narrative which explained why things in the present existed in their current 
state;12 the first chapter is therefore a vital part of the author’s attempt to harmonise the 
relationship between the study of feudal law and the socio-historical context in which 
the law emerged. In spite of this, the first chapter, in particular, is often overlooked.13 
Pocock, for example, observed that Craig traced the origins of feudalism ‘at least as far 
back as the Germanic invasions’ of late antiquity, that ‘[h]e begins...by explaining that, 
for reasons of climatic influence which recall Bodin, servitude amongst the northern 
peoples was more just and clement than amongst the southern’.14 Yet Pocock is here 
referencing Craig’s fourth chapter (de feudorum origine et progressu);15 he is therefore 
choosing to pass over the first three chapters amounting, in the present writer’s English 
translation, to some 17,000 words or just under ten per cent. of the entire first book, and 
to begin with the fourth chapter. Of the existing seventeenth century Scots-language 
compendia of Craig, one actually excises sections 1.1-8 entirely.16 
 
From the point of view of modern legal historians, possessed of a nuanced and 
sophisticated understanding of western law’s evolution, it could seem reasonable to 
treat these chapters as having no intrinsic value for the study of the wider topic and 
thesis of feudal law qua feudal law, as constituting introductory material for students 
or the kind of fluff one must tolerate when reading the work of a man who fancied 
himself an antiquarian. These chapters, however, are neither fluff nor padding. Rather, 
they constitute a core element of Craig’s understanding of law and its authority within 
the rest of the book and, by overlooking it, we are limiting our own ability to approach 
and understand Craig’s schema for law’s evolution. Few things, then, better illustrate 
the artificial divisions which modern academic methodologies can impose.  
 
The central thesis of the Jus feudale, to the extent we can usefully adduce one,17 
is that feudal law is a  ‘pan-European system’,18 a universal structure found across every 
                                                 
12 See Cairns, Fergus & MacQueen, ‘Legal Humanism’, 51-52 on Craig’s understanding of history’s 
‘broad sweep of development’ and H. L. MacQueen, ‘Regiam Majestatem, Scots Law, and National 
Identity’, 74 Scottish Historical Review (1995), 1-25 at 15-16 on the way in which Craig’s humanist 
education and ‘turn of mind’ allowed him to recognise the historical changes to which Scots law had 
been subject; cf. Rodgers, ‘Humanism’, 130 on the contrasting medieval conception of history as no 
more than a ‘valuable repository of examples and precedents’. 
13 A notable exception to this is Dr A. R. C. Simpson whose unpublished LLM dissertation, Thomas 
Craig of Riccarton and the Genesis of the Scottish Legal Historiographical Tradition, University of 
Aberdeen, 2007, provides new and valuable insights into this part of the text. 
14 Pocock, The Ancient Constitution, 80. 
15 Jus feudale 1.4.3. 
16 National Library of Scotland MS.5437; see Dolezalek, Jus Commune, vol.2, 56-57. 
17Cf. Cairns, Fergus & MacQueen, ‘Legal Humanism’, 49. 
18 C. Kidd, British identities before nationalism, Cambridge, 2004, 280; cf. Cairns, ‘Breve Testatum’, 
313, 322. 
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part of Christendom and even in the Islamic world beyond.19 Craig’s intent was for his 
writings to be understood not simply in a Scottish, or even British, context but within a 
wider European discourse.20 The decision to write in Latin, the universal language of 
Europe, underscores the universal nature of feudal law and also the fact that Craig’s 
monograph was no mere practick, no handbook for local practitioners,21  but constituted 
instead a profound study of feudal law at the European level which deserved to sit 
alongside the works of Zasius, Hotman, Bodin and Cujas;22 and, indeed, the Jus feudale 
was the only work of Scottish legal Humanism actually to gain an audience in the rest 
of Europe.23 
 
The first chapter is the mechanism through which Craig signals his intent to his 
readers by writing about the genesis of law, community, monarchy and state as human 
societal universalities. That is to say, feudal law is to be understood as one facet of a 
process of legal development and evolution that stretches all the way back to the Tower 
of Babel. Readers are not expected to interpret feudal law as something discrete from 
the historical (and, indeed, mythological) process of legal evolution but rather as a facet 
or aspect of a type of law no different from, and no less universal than, civil and canon 
law. The foundations of feudal law are thus to be found in the aetiology of the earliest 
human societies and the laws to which they gave birth. 
 
 
III. DISSECTING THE JUS FEUDALE 
 
1. Jus feudale 1.1.1: Craig’s introduction 
 
                                                 
19 Epistola nuncupatoria, Hoc etiam jus feudale his multis seculis omnibus Europaeis gentibus ita 
placuit, ut nulla sit in Christian orbe gens (addo etiam et immanissimos Turcas) quae non ex eo leges 
suas et instituta descripsit. (‘The Feudal law has been used by all European nations for many centuries, 
so that there is no nation in the Christian world (and I even include the monstrous Turks) which has not 
copied from it its own laws and institutes.’) Craig attempts to explain the Turkish timariot as a form of 
feudalism and develops an etymology in which the Turkish tîmâr derives from the Greek τιμὴ 
(honorarium, stipend). On the timariot itself, see K. Karpat, Studies on Ottoman social and political 
history, Leiden, 2002, 333ff.; cf. also Encyclopaedia of Islam, Leiden, 1913-1936, s.v. tîmâr.  
20 E. A. R. Brown, ‘The Tyranny of a Construct: Feudalism and Historians of Medieval Europe’, 79 
American Historical Review (1974), 1063-1088 at 1064; Cairns, ‘Breve Testatum’, 313. 
21 Pocock, The Ancient Constitution calls the Jus feudale ‘a book for Scotsmen’ (84) but it was more 
properly a book for all feudists, for all lawyers and scholars living in countries which employed a feudal 
legal system; which is to say, though primarily about the feudal law as practised in Scotland, it was 
actually written for, and to be understood by, all Europeans. The text has been described appositely as ‘a 
pre-digested encyclopaedia of the learning of the jus commune feudorum’ (J. W. Cairns & G. McLeod, 
‘Thomas Craig, Sir Martin Wright and Sir William Blackstone: the English Discovery of Feudalism’, 21 
Journal of Legal History (2000), 54-66 at 57). See also J. W. Cairns, ‘Institutional Writings in Scotland 
Reconsidered’, in A. Kiralfy, and H. L. MacQueen, eds., New Perspectives in Scottish Legal History, 
London, 1984, 100. 
22 Not for no reason did Mencken describe the 1716 edition in a subtitle as opus in Germania dudum 
desideratum and it is inconceivable that Craig did not foresee the value of his work to European feudists. 
Cf. esp. 1.2.13: At licet Fridericus Aenobarbus leges Romanorum et publicari et doceri praecepit, nullus 
tamen apud Germons juri Romanorum locus sed tantum juri feudali, ut post dicemus. (‘Although 
Frederick Barbarossa ordered Roman law to be both publicised and taught, the law of the Romans had 
no force in Germany; only the Feudal law did, as we will afterwards discuss.’) 
23 Cairns, Fergus & MacQueen, ‘Legal Humanism’, 59 
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The Jus feudale opens with the line:24 ‘Before we begin to discuss the nature and state 
of feudalism, it would be worthwhile to introduce a few things about the earliest origin 
of law’.25 The Latin phrase facere operae pretium (‘to make something worthwhile’) is 
also the opening three words of the praefatio to Livy’s Ab urbe condita (albeit in the 
form of an indirect question in the future tense). Craig’s echoing of Livy is no 
coincidence; rather, it is a statement of dialectic intent affirming that Livy is an 
historiographical pattern and frame for the Jus feudale.26 The author thus opens the text 
with an explicit statement that he is at least as much historian as lawyer and that the Jus 
feudale is as much a history of legal institutions as a practical work for feudal lawyers.27 
 
More than that, however, the first book of the Ab urbe condita acts as the model 
for Craig’s first chapter. Livy’s first book, which has been called a ‘prose epic’ and a 
‘counterpart of Vergil’s Aeneid’,28 was published separately from the rest of the text 
and gives an account not of Rome’s history but of her legendary or semi-legendary past, 
one which acts as introduction to Livy’s ‘real’ historical narrative. It deals with the 
arrival of the Trojans and foundation of the city of Rome and continues down to the 
overthrow of Tarquinius Superbus, both topics upon which Craig himself touches in 
the course of his first two chapters.29 Later in the Jus feudale, Livy will take something 
of a back seat to Tacitus,30 yet, in the first and second chapters, Livy is Craig’s 
historiographical model as Cicero is his philosophical source and Bodin his 
contemporary literary ideal. Livy is an object of emulation and the reason why Craig 
opens what is otherwise a dense history of legal development with a fantastic account 
of human prehistory, an account which goes out of its way to include elements from the 
Livian mytho-historical narrative and which, like Livy’s first book, forms a body 
discrete from the larger work of which it is notionally a part. 
 
Perhaps of greater significance, Livy’s own fascination with what he saw as the 
conflict between Rome’s traditional values and the corruption and decadence of Rome 
in the first century BC, the starting point for his whole historiographical project,31 has 
clearly been internalised by Craig and constitutes the foundation for his understanding 
of the evolution of societies and their laws and of the feudal system itself.32 As we shall 
see, the inevitability of human corruption and the degradation, over time, of human 
virtue are a recurring leitmotif of the first chapter and represent Craig’s marriage of 
Christian motifs about moral degeneracy to Livian (and broader Roman) concerns about 
political and social corruption. 
 
                                                 
24 The author will, for ease of reference, follow the divisions found in Baillie’s 1732 edition. However 
readers should note that these divisions were not Craig’s creation. To assist  readers, quotations from 
non-English texts will give both the original and the author’s translation. 
25Antequam feudorum naturam et conditionem tractare aggredimur, operae pretium facere videbor si 
pauca praemisero de juris prima origine. 
26 On the centrality of Graeco-Roman sources as model for Renaissance lawyers, see R. Bolgar, The 
Classical Inheritance and its Beneficiaries, Cambridge, 1958, 293. 
27 Baird Smith, ‘Feudalist’, 295, 301. 
28 R. Mellor, The Roman Historians, New York, 1999, 56; C. J. Hemer, The Book of Acts in the Setting 
of Hellenistic History, Tübingen, 1989, 81; but D. A. Pauw, ‘The Dramatic Elements in Livy’s History’, 
34 Acta Classica (1991), 33-49 considers this characterisation ‘a rather slighting verdict’ (33). 
29 On the founding of cities by Aeneas, see 1.1.4; on Tarquinius Superbus, see 1.2.1. 
30 The extensive quotation from the Germania at 1.4.3 is the most obvious example but, throughout the 
Jus feudale, Tacitus seems to be cited more frequently than Livy. 
31 See Livy, praefatio 4-12. 
32 Baird Smith, ‘Feudalist’, 301; cf. Cairns, Fergus & MacQueen, ‘Legal Humanism’, 52. 
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2. Jus feudale 1.1.2: humanity after the Universal Flood 
 
Craig’s opening for his aetiology of law is the Tower of Babel in the aftermath of 
Noah’s Flood. So the foundations of law, as Craig understood them, are found in the 
fragmentation of the human race.33 The use of a biblical starting point is unsurprising 
as Craig also opens his De jure successionis regni Angliae with a biblical narrative.34 
For sixteenth century authors in general, sources for prehistory were limited to the 
classical and the biblical. At the same time, for the literary product of any early modern 
Christian society, the Bible is the most natural textual frame and one which enjoyed an 
unchallenged cosmological hegemony, particularly in relation to human social origins. 
If the Bible served any purpose for a Christian culture in this period, it was as an account 
of how human society was created and as a definition of the limits of acceptable thought 
and action within that society. The Bible was the explicator of all things to do with 
human existence and creation. Yet Craig, from the very start of his text and despite his 
apparently zealous Protestant credentials,35 offers neither simplistic nor unquestioning 
adherence to biblical sources. The biblical account is neither absolute nor 
incontrovertible in Craig’s worldview. Rather, it is one more historical source and 
subjected to the same tests, criticisms and rational enquiries as Craig would (and does) 
apply to his other sources.36 
 
This process of rational criticism is initiated from the very start of the text and 
continues throughout, arguably becoming one of the defining literary characteristics of 
the Jus feudale. It is noteworthy that Craig is not actually discussing the Tower of Babel 
but turrim illam Babylonicam. Neither the indeclinable Latin Babel nor its related 
adjective Babelicus are employed; rather, Craig goes straight to the classical Latin and 
gives his readers not the Tower of Babel but ‘the famous Babylonian Tower’. This 
usage has limited mediaeval provenance – only Bernard of Clairvaux seems to have 
used it and then only once – but it found favour during the Renaissance as a more 
learned, more precise, more classical and, therefore, less biblical variant.37 Amongst 
those who used it, is another famous European lawyer, Grotius.38 Whether one sees this 
as stylistic choice or scholarly pretension on Craig’s part, it is certain that the term 
anchors Craig within the humanist literary tradition. It represents, in a sense, Craig’s 
assertion that he will subject biblical history to rational and scholarly (and therefore 
classicising) inquiry, removing it from its usual religio-mythological setting and re-
interpreting it according to human reason. 
                                                 
33 On the religious implications of the Babel story (specifically, that it is a story of rebellion against God 
and therefore against Natural Law), see Simpson, Thomas Craig, 80ff. 
34 Note, however, that where the Jus feudale begins with Babel, the De jure successionis begins after the 
Flood. 
35 Baird Smith, ‘Feudalist’, 279 calls Craig a ‘Protestant lawyer but lightly encumbered with theological 
baggage’ but the strength of his religious belief is apparent in a great deal of his literary output and in his 
personal papers; cf. Vita Cragii, xvii. 
36 This interpretation is at odds with that of Pocock, The Ancient Constitution, 6-7 where humanist writers 
are reluctant to apply ‘critical techniques’ learned in other disciplines to the study of law and legal 
history. But see Cairns, Fergus & MacQueen, ‘Legal Humanism’, 56 for an astute analysis of Craig’s 
critical historical approach to sources that involving ‘close attention to, and criticism of, texts’. 
37 Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermo in assumptione 5 is the only pre-Renaissance example of the usage turris 
Babylonica which I have been able to find. It is, however, used widely by humanist writers; for example, 
Johannes Herold, editor of the 1563 Basil edition of Bede, lists turris Babylonica and Babyloniae in his 
index even though Bede himself does not use either phrase. 
38 Grotius, De jure belli et pacis 2.2.3. 
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Where the biblical account states that the Tower of Babel was built in an effort 
to reach heaven,39 Craig instead follows Josephus in explaining that it was actually built 
by the survivors of the Flood as a safety precaution ‘so they would not be overwhelmed 
by the sudden force and flood of the waters’.40 The question of whether this contradicts 
the biblical account or supplements it remains an open question among certain 
Christians down to the present. There seems to be nothing intrinsically contradictory 
between the narratives of Genesis and Josephus – it is, after all, wholly possible that 
the reason for wishing to reach heaven was to escape the rise of waters – so the matter 
depends upon whether one believes the Bible is complete and absolute needing no 
further explication or whether one believes (as Craig clearly did) that the bare biblical 
account can be developed by the application of human reason and scholarship. At the 
very least, Craig was supplementing – but possibly correcting and rationalising – an 
account that, in his day, would have been interpreted as literal and complete by most of 
his contemporaries and co-religionists. One must not construe this as nascent anti-
religiosity on his part, as Craig was clearly firm in his religious convictions. Instead, 
we should interpret this as Craig’s recognition of the fine distinction between the Bible 
as instrument of religious revelation and the Bible as historical source.41 Craig neither 
denies nor challenges the Bible’s religious mandate or its rôle as revelator of divine 
truth; rather, and in a very limited sense, he scrutinises what we might call the Bible’s 
editorial commentary on events and thus expands upon the biblical-historical account 
without at any stage touching upon the central doctrinal message of the Babel story, 
which, as Simpson says, is one of rebellion.42 
 
Craig accepts the intrinsic truth of the Babel story but rationalises and expands 
its context through reference to a classical text which gives the story meaning beyond 
the bald biblical account (viz., that the people who settled in Shinar built the tower in 
order to make a name for themselves by reaching heaven). It is nevertheless unlikely 
that Craig had direct access to a Greek text of Josephus;43 given his apparent limitations 
in Greek and the relative rarity of the text in northern Europe, he probably had not. It 
is, for example, highly significant that the first English translation of Josephus 
(produced by Thomas Lodge in 1602) was founded not upon a Greek text but upon 
French and Latin translations and depended very heavily upon Bodin’s 
historiographical theories.44 It is most likely that Craig’s source was another humanist 
writer, probably Bodin but possibly Zasius or Hotman, who had access to Josephus and 
the ability to read it in Greek. Craig may not even have known that Josephus was the 
ultimate source of this specific account and it seems significant that he did not attach 
                                                 
39 Genesis 11:1-9. 
40 ne subita aquarum vi et inundatione obrueretur. The relevant text of Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 
1.4.2 reads ἀμυνεῖσθαι τε τὸν θεὸν πάλιν ἠπείλει τὴν γῆν ἐπικλύσαι θελήσαντα· πύργον γὰρ 
οἰκοδομήσειν ὑψηλότερον ἢ τὸ ὕδωρ ἀναβῆναι δυνηθείη, μετελεύσεσθαι δὲ καὶ τῆς τῶν προγόνων 
ἀπωλείας· (‘He [Nimrod] said he would take revenge on God, if He decided to flood the land again; for 
he would build a tower higher than the waters could reach and so would punish God for destroying their 
ancestors.’) 
41 Cf. Baird Smith, ‘Feudalist’, 292 where Craig is said to treat the Libri feudorum as no more than ‘an 
interesting historical document’. 
42 Simpson, Thomas Craig, 80. 
43A printed copy of Jospehus had been produced in Venice as early as 1481 by Rinaldo de Novimagio 
(or Reynaldus of Nijmegen); see L. Armstrong, ‘A Renaissance Flavius Josephus’, 58 Yale University 
Library Gazette, 1984, 122-139 at 122. 
44 F. J. Levy, Tudor Historical Thought, San Marino, Calif., 1967, repr. Toronto, 2004, 206. 
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Josephus’ name to this part of the narrative but instead mentions him near the chapter’s 
end along with a few other sources.45  
 
Rational criticism of biblical narrative continues in the account of humanity’s 
spread after Babel. Craig describes it thus: ‘People dispersed and migrated first through 
Assyria but then through the whole of Asia and Palestine and eventually into Greece 
(which, in the Holy Scriptures, is definitively said to be an island) and the whole of 
Europe’.46 The 1732 Edinburgh edition and Lord Clyde’s 1934 translation both give 
Isaiah 42:10 as the biblical source which Craig is here disputing while the 1655 and 
1716 Leipzig editions cite no source. The precise part of the Bible with which Craig 
takes issue is considerably less important than the fact that he does so at all. Biblical 
sources, biblical accounts are again subjected to the same critical inquiry as any other 
source and when they are seen to be wrong or at odds with reason, they are criticised 
and corrected. 
 
This section demonstrates the author’s broad approach to historiography. 
Despite describing his account of the origin of law as repetita antiquitatis memoria and, 
further, despite claiming that he had included this material only because it was ‘not 
well-known to everyone, but [is] essential to the treatise we have begun on the origin 
and nature of feus’,47 there is no slavish repetition of source narratives. From just this 
one section we can discern the process of rational historical analysis to which Craig’s 
sources are subject and the construction of an historical report which, though dependent 
on sources both ancient and contemporary, was resolutely Craig’s own.48 This 
independence of enquiry and thought makes it all the more obvious on those occasions 
when he becomes, effectively, a tape recorder for another author’s opinions. Though 
the Jus feudale is a legal text, it is also an historiographical document and an attestation 
of Craig’s cultural and mental mechanisms for understanding both the processes and 
the presentation of human history.49 
 
 
3. Jus feudale 1.1.3: the origins of state and society 
 
From Babel, Craig’s narrative moves on to the ur-societies of prehistory which 
prefigure true states. The story is straightforward: after leaving Babel, humans sought 
the most attractive locales for settlement, giving particular preference to the availability 
of woods, streams and fertile land. However, human nature being what it is, larger and 
more powerful families used force to seize the best land which had already been 
claimed by others. The smaller families responded by banding together in a process 
which Craig describes as accessio, deliberately invoking the Civilian legal term.50 
Such, then, were the foundations from which the first communities, and eventually the 
                                                 
45 JF 1.1.13. 
46 Prius per Assyriam, mox universam Asiam et Palaestinam dispersi homines, in Graeciam etiam (quam 
insulam in sacris literis dici certum est) omnesque regiones Europaeas commigrarunt. 
47 Jus feudale, 1.1.1; Neque enim haec omnibus sunt obvia et ad eum quem instituimus de feudorum 
origine et natura tractatum pernecessaria. 
48 See Baird Smith, ‘Feudalist’ 272-3 on the legal-historiographical milieu in France when Craig studied 
there and 278 on how Craig took on ‘characteristics of the French jurists and practitioners of his youth’. 
49 Baird Smith (ibid. 283) was clearly aware that Craig was equally historian and lawyer but insisted that 
‘his historical sense was blunted by his doctrinaire enthusiasm for an abstract feudal system or ideal’. 
50 Note that Craig appears to echo Bede, Retractatio in actus apostolorum 3.116-118. We know, from 
the De union regnorum Britanniae, that Craig had read Bede extensively. 
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first cities, sprang.51 This is followed by a definition of society: ‘For society is nothing 
other than the joining together of different people; nor is a city anything but some 
general consensus or amalgamation emerging from the alliance and union of different 
families, established beneath some common law and government constituted for the 
purpose of binding communities or families together in duty.52 
 
This definition bears a striking similarity to the very first paragraph of Bodin’s 
De republica: ‘A commonwealth is a number of families and the things they share in 
common restrained by a supreme authority and reason’;53 one can expand upon this 
from Bodin’s Methodus, which says Cicero ‘defines a commonwealth as a multitude of 
men united for the sake of living well’.54 Craig’s definition is somewhat more 
developed but it nevertheless clearly derives, in its particulars, from Bodin. Both are 
focused on the idea that the first states were unions of families – indeed, that a state is 
just a collection of families – and both imply that state and kinship, at least in the earliest 
societies, were inextricably linked.55 This is not the only text in which Craig discusses 
the origins of states and citizenship. He does so in the opening to the De jure 
successionis, citing Cicero as saying that a city is societas hominum jure congregata 
(‘a society of people united by the law’).56 In the Jus feudale, however, it is plain that 
Craig draws upon Bodin, the contemporary interpreter, and not solely, or even 
primarily, upon the classical sources.57 
 
Bodin gives the following account of the world before the creation of states: 
‘Before any city or any form of commonwealth existed, each father was supreme over 
his family and had the right of life and death over his children and wives. Later, violence 
and a desire to rule, and then greed and a longing for revenge, armed men against each 
other’.58 Comparing it with Craig’s description of the battle for resources, we can see 
only limited overlap between the two texts. Cicero’s De inventione (1.2) is reflected in 
both Craig and Bodin, as it relates that, before the creation of law, the world was a 
violent place where the strong ruled over the weak. Cicero’s cultural importance for 
medieval and Renaissance thinkers can hardly be overstated so any Ciceronian presence 
in Craig’s text can be assumed to be a result of direct reading rather than indirect reading 
                                                 
51 Ita amicitiae et societates primum initiae, ex cujus fundamentis, in certa naturaeque consentanea 
ratione positis, civitates postea conditae. (‘Thus friendship and communities first began, having been 
ordained in accordance with the clear logic of nature, and from those foundations cities were 
established.’) 
52 neque enim aliud est societas quam diversorum inter se hominum conjunctio; nequre civitas, quam ex 
variorum familiarum conspiratione et unione generalis aliquis consensus seu coetus sub aliquo communi 
jure et imperio ad societates seu familias in officio continendas constitutus. 
53 Respublica est familiarum rerumque inter ipsas communium summa potestate ac ratione moderata 
multitudo. Jean Bodin, De republica p.1 (all references are to pages in the 1586 Paris edition). 
54 Tullius rempublicam definit hominum multitudinem bene vivendi causa sociatam. Bodin, Methodus ad 
facilem historiarum cognitionem p.195 (all references are to pages in the 1610 Geneva edition). 
55 For more on the position of families in the origin of the state, see Bodin De republica  p.365. 
56 De successionis regni Angliae, 1.2 (p.7 in Gadderar’s 1703 English translation); note, however, that 
this is not a quotation from Cicero but rather a summary of the De officiis 3.17 and perhaps 2.4 or possibly 
parts of the Somnio Scipionis. 
57Craig was not the only Scottish lawyer of this period to depend upon Bodin. See A. R. C. Simpson, 
‘Counsel and the Crown: History, Law and Politics in the Thought of David Chalmers of Ormond’, 36 
Journal of Legal History (2015) 3-42. 
58 58 Prius enim quam ulla civitas aut reipublicae forma extaret, pater quisque familiae summum ius vitae 
ac necis habuit in liberos et uxores. Postea vero quam vis et imperandi cupiditas, tum etiam avaritia et 
ultionis appetitus aliis in alios arma suppeditavit. Bodin, De republica, p.46. 
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via Bodin.59 One interesting deviation from the De inventione is that, where Cicero 
describes the earliest men as devoid of reason, Craig (like Bodin) states the first 
alliances (amicitiae) and communities (societates) emerged from their innate 
rationality. 
 
The De inventione contends that the earliest states were the creation of one 
eloquent speaker who convinced the bestial and irrational masses of the wisdom of 
organised society; Craig, however, treats society, community and human association as 
a natural consequence of two factors: human reason and utility. And, of course, these 
two factors flow from and feed into each other. Societies arose when weak families 
took counsel together and realised that only through the force of their combined 
numbers could they resist the oppression of those who were stronger than they. Society 
is thus a function of utility. This distinctly Epicurean flavour is also to be found in 
Bodin and is one to which Craig will return throughout the first chapter of the Jus 
feudale.60 Craig’s belief that social cooperation is natural to humans also explains one 
curious omission. While Bodin provides a detailed definition of the word familia, Craig 
provides none,61 apparently assuming that the cooperative and collaborative nature and 
patriarchal leadership of family will automatically be understood by readers. 
 
This section provides an interesting and early example of the way in which 
Craig navigates his dependence on sources to arrive at a reading which is, critically and 
intellectually, his own. 
 
 
4. Jus feudale 1.1.4: citizen and state 
 
In the following two sections, Craig goes on to discuss the founding of the first cities 
and the development of citizenship (1.1.4) before treating the emergence of kingship as 
an institution (1.1.5). These sections are illustrative of Craig’s historiographical 
technique and, throughout, one is conscious that Buchanan’s De jure regni apud Scotos 
joins Bodin as both source and frame.62 
 
‘Citizens,’ Craig says in the section’s first sentence ‘may properly be said to be 
those who live beneath a single bond of law and community, whereas a city is a joining 
together of many families or communities beneath government and political union’.63 
By comparison, Bodin defines citizenship thus: ‘A citizen is nothing but a free man 
                                                 
59 Cf. P. Hume Brown, George Buchanan, Humanist and Reformer, Edinburgh, 1890, 44-45 on the 
‘superstitious worship paid to Cicero by the stylists of Italy’. 
60 It is not probable that Craig had a deep understanding of Epicureanism but he would have been 
conscious of it through Bodin; see Methodus, p.263. 
61 Familia est plurium sub unius ac eiusdem patrisfamilias imperium subditorum, earumque rerum quae 
ipsius propriae sunt, recta moderatio. (‘A family is the proper governance of a group subordinated 
beneath the authority of a single patriarch and of those things which belong to him.’) Bodin, De 
republica, p.8.   
62 Baird Smith, ‘Feudalist’, 286 compares Craig unfavourably with Buchanan (‘the penetrating political 
analysis which is to be found in…Buchanan’s De jure regni…is absent from Craig’s pages’) while 
seeming to not to notice the extent to which Craig adapts Buchanan’s arguments for his own ends. Hume 
Brown, Buchanan, is more judicious when he points out that the De jure regni makes ‘no contribution 
to political science’ (290) and that Buchanan lacked a ‘philosophic conception’, such as Bodin had, of 
the historian’s task (298). 
63 Cives enim proprie dicuntur qui sub uno vinculo juris et societatis vivunt; civitas ver conjunctio 
plurium sive familiarum sive societatum sub uno imperio et foedere. 
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bound to the supreme authority of another’.64 So once more, Craig broadly follows 
Bodin in defining the terms of his discussion but again provides a definition that is more 
developed, more complex. 
 
As Craig moves on, he takes the text in a direction more characteristically his 
own by discussing the etymology of the two Latin words for city – urbs and civitas – 
and explaining the difference between them.65 In doing so, he makes extensive use of 
classical sources – he refers to the Aeneid (7.55),66 the Digest (50.16.239.6)67 and 
Caesar’s De bello Gallico (1.1.2 and 1.2).68 The significance of this is not 
inconsiderable. Where Bodin provided simple definitions for the terms he employs in 
order to facilitate the reader’s understanding of his argument, Craig develops a deeper 
philological treatment of the origins and etymology of language (something he will do 
throughout the Jus feudale). Nor does he do this as some antiquarian digression; rather, 
it is key part of Craig’s historico-literary approach, a key element in his analysis of the 
origins of law, to delve deeply into the sometimes hidden, sometimes forgotten 
meanings of words, phrases and, indeed, the laws themselves. 
 
Leaving aside these considerations, Craig’s account of the creation of the first 
cities proceeds as follows: the first cities emerged from alliances which had been 
established for self-defence in a violent, lawless world. In time, these communities 
discovered trade, weapons, fortifications and the need for contracts or agreements. In 
the absence of laws and judges, the agreements were unenforceable, so the best man in 
the community was chosen to settle disputes and pass judgment fairly. The men thus 
chosen were the first kings and Craig thus moves on from the establishment of cities to 
the establishment of monarchies.69 
 
The connection of trade, warfare, resources and community is another element 
which Craig seems to derive from Bodin – and, significantly, when Bodin lists the 
necessary items for nascentes respublicae, he lists not only food, water, a healthy 
climate and good geography,70 but also materials for fortifications and weapons which 
are to be used both in self-defence and in aggressive campaigns to secure more 
resources, more materials and more luxuries.71 Bodin emphasises the relationship 
                                                 
64Est autem civis nihil aliud quam liber homo, qui summae alterius potestati obligatur. Bodin, De 
republica pp.45-46. 
65 On Craig’s regular use of etymologies to facilitate legal discussion, see Cairns, Fergus & MacQueen. 
‘Legal Humanism’, 51. On the importance of philology to humanist textual interpretation, see Rodgers, 
‘Humanism’, 1985, 130. 
66 Note that the only English translation, the 1934 edition by Lord Clyde, badly misunderstands what is 
happening in the Aeneid at this point and imports that misunderstanding into the text. 
67 Urbs ab urbo appellata est: urbare est aratro definire. et Varus ait urbum appellari curvaturam aratri, 
quod in urbe condenda adhiberi solet. (‘The word urbs is from urbum. The related verb urbare means 
‘to mark a boundary using a plough’. Varus says that the curve of a plough, which is customarily used 
in marking out the bounds of a city that was about to be built, was called an urbum’). 
68 That is, the section where Orgetorix rallies the Helvetian civitas for foreign conquest. Craig’s point is 
to illustrate that the usage of civitas in classical Latin (apud bonos au[c]tores) refers to the state or the 
citizens as a corporate entity and not to the city as a geographical location. 
69 On this section in general, see Simpson, Thomas Craig, 60-61. 
70 M. L. Thompson, ‘Jean Bodin’s Six Books on the Commonwealth and the Early Modern Nation’ in 
Eriksonas, L., and Müller, L., Statehood Before And Beyond Ethnicity (Brussels, 2005) 53-66, 61-63 
71Beatior tamen futura civitas est, quae his aucta virtutibus, fundos habuerit ubertate fertiles aut quantum 
satis est ad civium alimenta: eaque sit aquarum ac spirabilis coeli temperatio, ut salubriter vivi possit, 
tum etiam materies ad exstruedas arces ac domos idonea; nisi regio satis ad vim hostium et ad iniurias 
caeli propulsandas per se ipsa tuta sit ac munita. Haec primordia sunt nascentis reipublicae, ut scilicet 
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between a community and its material resources – food, water, building materials and 
so on. We have already seen Bodin’s characterisation of the commonwealth as a union 
‘for the sake of living well’.72 For Bodin, the condition of living well entailed a strong 
material component. People lived collectively first in communities and later in cities 
and states because they could enjoy not only a safer but also a more prosperous and 
materially better mode of life together than they could ever achieve separately. 
 
Clearly, Craig has been influenced by Bodin’s doctrine of social materialism. 
As we saw above, in 1.1.3, he discussed competition for resources and presented the 
conflicts that arose for control of them as the main spur for the creation of the earliest 
societies; families formed alliances and then communities in order to protect their 
control of specific resources. In this section, though, Craig develops Bodin’s theory by 
construing resources not only as a potential source of conflict but also as an impetus for 
trade and, as we shall see, for Craig trade becomes an impetus for law.73 
 
The development of trade is explained as follows: 
Privately they discussed their own resources, what they had at home and what 
they lacked. As a result, nearby families supplemented those in need with their 
own supplies. In their homes, they cultivated crafts; outside their homes, they 
traded, so that what one lacked, he could gain from another. This was not done 
gratis but in exchange for something of equal value. Thus agreements were 
brought together and contracts were born.74 
At this stage, Craig is still focused on the interactions between the individual 
members of his ur-communities. Trade is not yet something that takes place between 
polities (or even between individual members of different communities) but something 
that is conducted within the polity by and between citizens or, rather, between semi-
autonomous citizen-families who together make up the civitas. These transactions 
required forms of rules which went beyond the simple obligation for mutual defence by 
which the communities were heretofore bound. As Craig explains, ‘It would not be 
possible for many people to unite in a single community unless they were obligated by 
                                                 
ea, parentur, sine quibus vivi nullo modo possit. Deinde quaerantur ea, quibus commodius vivitur, ut 
medicamenta ad morborum curationem: metalla quibus instrumenta opificibus armaque militibus 
necessaria conflati possint, non tantum ad repellendos, verumetiam ad ulciscendos hostes ac latrones. 
Iam vero cum inexplebiles sint hominum cupiditates, postea quam parta sunt ea quae necessaria, 
quaeque utilia putantur, deliciis etiam affluere, ac voluptates inanes consectari libet, ut suavius vivi 
iucundiusque possit. (‘The city will be happier which is strengthened by these advantages: it should have 
fertile fields in abundance or in sufficiency for the sustenance of the citizens; there should be a sufficiency 
of water and a mild climate, so that it will be possible to live healthily. Then there will be materials for 
raising strongholds and suitable houses. If geography by itself is not enough to repulse the violence of 
the enemy and the injuries of heaven, there will be a secure fortification. These are the basic needs of the 
nascent commonwealth, without which no kind of life is possible. But then they will seek those things 
by which one lives more conveniently – medicines for the treatment of sickness; metals which they can 
cast into tools for workers and weapons for soldiers – not just for defence but actually for taking revenge 
on enemies and brigands. Men’s desires are insatiable and when they have the things they need and the 
things they deem useful, they will afterwards long for an abundance of the delights and empty pleasures 
from which one lives pleasantly and happily.’) Bodin, De republica, pp.4-5. 
72 Bodin,  Methodus, p.195. 
73 See J. W. Cairns, ‘The Civil Law Tradition in Scottish Legal Thought’ in D. L. Carey Miller and R. 
Zimmermann, eds., The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law, Berlin, 1997, 191-223 at 200. 
74 Tum etiam privatim opes suas exponebant, quid domi suppetebat, quid non; inde defectus suos vicinae 
familiae supplebant, domi artificia colebant, foris permutabant res ad invicem, ut quod uni deerat ab 
altero caperet, non gratuito, sed re non minoris utilitatis in vicinum collata. Sic et rationes contrahebant 
et contractus nascebantur. 
14 
 
shared bonds through which they would first restrain the violence of more powerful 
men and then be bound by mutual duties in their private dealings with one another.’75 
 
Yet, these vincula were a toothless guard dog so long as they lacked a 
mechanism for enforcement: 
In spite of these private covenants or agreements, individual disputes could not 
be adjudicated and new ones arose every day amongst the citizens of the 
community – and the more people in the union, the more frequent were these 
disputes; and so, since they were acting with such anger, such desire, such greed, 
the very best man of the community was chosen by common consensus, a man 
who would be acquainted with transgression and injustice, who would decide 
what was fair between neighbours.76 
 
For Craig, the process by which law was created in the earliest human societies 
was wholly pragmatic but, more than that, it relies upon commerce and the attendant 
need for contractual enforceability and predictability as the catalyst for legal 
development. Self-interest meant that individuals could be trusted to defend their 
neighbours but that same self-interest meant they could not be trusted not to bilk or 
cheat those same neighbours. Thus, Craig’s model has trade disputes between 
individual families as the catalyst driving forward the development of the earliest 
systems of legal adjudication and enforcement.  
  
 
5. Jus feudale 1.1.5: kings and monarchy 
 
In Craig’s narrative, the adjudication of disputes was entrusted to men of good character 
who were titled kings and were initially judges and nothing more. This is, of course, a 
common motif amongst classical, medieval and early modern writers; Buchanan, 
indeed, advances the notion that kings of high moral standing are not only an inspiration 
to their people but can actually alter their subjects’ disposition.77 
 
In another of his philological excursions, Craig explains that the name of their 
office (rex) is a consequence of their duty (regendus). Thus, Craig’s kings are guides 
whose responsibility is ‘to prevent [their people] from going astray’. He emphasises 
this interpretation of monarchy by referencing Homer’s epithet for kings, ‘shepherds of 
the people’,78 a phrase discussed in Buchanan’s De jure regni as an epithet of 
                                                 
75 Sed cum fieri non posset, ut plures simul in una societate consentirent nisi mutuis vinculis colligati, 
quibus primum potentiorum vim reprimerent et privatim ipsi inter se reciprocis officiis interius 
continerentur. 
76 Nec tamen ex his privatis conventionibus sive pactis, singulae offensiones dijudicari poterant, quae 
cotidie novae inter ejusdem societatis cives oriebantur, quoque plures in uno coetu, eo frequentiores 
erant. Itaque cum multa iracunde, multa libidinose, multa avare fierent, electus est communi consensu 
vir illius societatis optimus, qui de offensione aut injuria cognosceret, quodque aequum esset inter 
vicinos decerneret. 
77 Buchanan, De jure regni, (pp.95-96 of the 1750 Glasgow edition), discusses the way that good kings, 
specifically Numa Pompilius, changed the savage and warlike temperament of the Romans, thus laying 
the foundations of their future greatness. 
78 Craig’s Latin term is pastores populorum, his version of Homer’s ποιμὴν λαῶν. This epithet is 
repeatedly applied to Agamemnon and Hector in the Iliad (e.g. 2.243; 4.413) and once to Dryas, a king 
of the Lapiths (Iliad 1.263). See R. Auty, Traditions of Heroic and Epic Poetry II: Characteristics and 
Techniques, London, 1989, 50 for a discussion of the poetic context; see K. Raaflaub, J. Ober and R. 
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Agamemnon and an indicator of a king’s rôle.79 They are shepherds of the people 
‘because, from the beginning, the governance and guardianship of the people were 
entrusted to them’.80 In keeping with his Greek theme, but probably also to advertise 
that his classical learning was wider than just the Latin, he goes on to mention Minos 
and Rhadamanthus as examples of ideal Greek kings who had ‘presided over their 
people with the utmost fairness’.81 In these examples too, Craig establishes that the 
prime qualification for the monarchic office is fairness. He develops both this point and 
his overall Greek theme by going on to state that ‘amongst the Athenians those who 
ruled after the kings were called δικασάι’.82 This is an intriguing remark showing, in 
more ways than one, both the limits and the pretensions of Craig’s classical knowledge. 
 
Anyone versed in Greek will recognise that Craig’s δικασάι is misspelt.83 It 
ought properly to be δικασταί. Craig has, in other words, dropped a tau (τ) and pushed 
the diacritic mark back from the iota (ι) to the alpha (α). It is, however, not only his 
Greek grammar which is problematic. His whole understanding of the function of an 
Athenian dicast is flawed. A dicast was a juror in the Athenian courts.84  He (and it 
always was a ‘he’) was a member of a volunteer body of 6,000 male citizens who were 
then assigned into smaller divisions of 500 known as dicasteries. He was neither 
lawmaker nor magistrate and had no executive authority.85 The words ‘dicast’ 
ultimately derives from the Greek δίκη, meaning ‘justice’, and therefore has a 
straightforward etymological base – a dicast is someone concerned with the dispensing 
of justice. In our modern sense, a dicast might be more akin to a kind of amateur judge 
than to a true juror because they were often called upon to work out the knotty problems 
caused by contradictory laws.86 Indeed, in the Hellenistic kingdoms which succeeded 
classical Greece, the term dicast was used, at least sometimes, to refer to a royal judge 
rather than a volunteer juror.87 
 
Craig is apparently mistaking the dicasts for the members of the Ekklesia 
(‘Assembly’) which acted as the main legislative body for democratic Athens. Both 
were volunteer bodies and while the dicasts numbered 6,000, the Assembly had a 
quorum of 6,000.88 Etymologically, however, the verb for participation in the Assembly 
                                                 
Wallace, Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece, Berkeley, 2007, 32 for the phrase as a marker of ideal 
Greek kingship. 
79 Buchanan, De jure regni, p.50. On the prince as ‘shepherd of the people’, cf. R. Zanzarri, L’educazione 
del principe dalla Grecia arcaica al Versailles, Cosenza, 1996, 12-13. 
80 quod procuratio et populi tutela eis esset ab intitio concredita. 
81 summa cum aequitate populis suis praefuissent. 
82 qui Atheniensibus post reges imperabant, δικασάι vocabantur. 
83 In the manuscripts, NLS Adv. MS 25.4.1 has διχαραι while NLS Adv. MS 25.4.2 has δονασαί, both 
of which seem to be nonsense words in Greek. Burnet’s 1655 edition has a grave accent instead of an 
acute. Note that δικάσαι is an aorist infinitive of the Greek verb δικάζω (‘to dispense justice’) but, in 
context, the word must be meant as a noun. 
84 Osborne, R., Athens and Athenian Democracy, Cambridge, 2010, has a respectable analysis of the 
Athenian legal system in ch. 9. 
85 Interestingly, Solon (whom Craig discusses at JF 1.1.15) allowed Athenian magistrates to act as 
dicasts: see G. Thür, ‘Oaths and Dispute Settlement in Ancient Greek Law’, in L. Foxhall and A. D. E. 
Lewis, eds., Greek Law in Its Political Setting, Oxford, 1996, 57-72 at 63. 
86 S. Todd, ‘Lysias against Nikomachos: the Fate of the Expert in Athenian Law’ in Foxhall & Lewis, 
Greek Law, 101-132 at 125. 
87 C. Haas, Alexandria in Late Antiquity: Topography and Social Conflict, Baltimore, 1997, 75. 
88 S. Hornblower, ‘Greece: the History of the Classical Period’, in J. Boardman, J. Griffin, and O. Murray, 
O., eds., The Oxford History of Greece and the Hellenistic World, Oxford, 1986, 142-176 at 157. 
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was ἐκκλησιάζω and the noun describing a participant was ἐκκλησιαστής.89 It seems 
unlikely that anyone with a good understanding of Greek would make the kinds of 
errors that Craig has made.90 Certainly, no-one could imagine George Buchanan 
making such elementary mistakes whether in grammar, spelling or terminology. 
Interestingly, Bodin, who is one of Craig’s favoured sources, uses the phrase (correctly 
spelt!) in the De republica,91 which, if we discount a later error in transcription by 
copyists of the Jus feudale, suggests that Craig misread or otherwise misunderstood the 
Greek letters. 
 
So, from this section, we can deduce that Craig was far from au fait with the 
governmental and legal structures of classical Athens. He may indeed have been a 
talented humanist possessed of a fine familiarity with classical Latin but he was not a 
scholar of Greece and his grasp of the Greek language, though probably better than that 
of most Scots (and, indeed, Europeans) of his age, was limited. One must ask why he 
would choose to labour these Greek elements, when he was neither in control of nor 
comfortable with his material. 
 
It may be that Craig was conscious of the debt he owed in this section to 
Buchanan’s De jure regni and wished to demonstrate his scholarly independence by 
going further than Buchanan had, by reaching out beyond his customary Latin and into 
not only Greek history but also Greek language (and Buchanan, of course, was a 
marvellously accomplished Greek scholar).92  However, it may equally be the case that 
Craig was simply eager to demonstrate his mastery of a still relatively obscure learned 
language and thereby to be understood as a member of the scholarly community of 
humanists with his work seen as part of that cultural continuum. It is a commonplace 
to describe Latin as the Occident’s language of learning from the classical period until 
quite recently; Greek, however, was a language of prestige, a language of the truly 
sophisticated.93 All learned men (and many who were not quite so learned) could speak 
and compose Latin,94 but many otherwise educated men lacked any grounding in 
Greek; as Bolgar has it, ‘The scholars who could understand their Homer or their Plato 
in the original were a small and select body’.95 By emphasising Greek phrases and 
Greek sources, Craig was showing himself to be a cut above the usual lawyerly stock – 
and Craig does emphasise Greek regularly. From his employment of the phrase δὶς διὰ 
πασῶν in the Epistola nuncupatoria (a phrase probably taken, directly or otherwise, 
                                                 
89 Liddell and Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon, s.vv. ἐκκλησιάζω and ἐκκλησιαστής. 
90 Lord Clyde, in his 1934 translation, simply rewrites Craig so that he is saying that the dicasts ‘were 
the successors of the kings in their judicial function’. This is one way to avoid an otherwise problematic 
section but it is not what the Latin says. 
91 Bodin, De republica, p.419. 
92 On Buchanan’s remarkably precise translations of Greek into Latin, see J-F. Chevalier, ‘George 
Buchanan and the Poetics of Borrowing in the Latin Translation of Euripides’ Medea’, in P. Ford, and 
R. P. H. Green, eds., George Buchanan: Poet and Dramatist, Swansea, 2009, 183-195. 
93 Cf. Bolgar, Classical Inheritance, 276, but see 313 on English hostility to the teaching of Greek at 
Oxford and Cambridge and particularly resentment that it would reduce these mediaeval institutions to 
the level of a ‘Lawyers’ University’. Cf. Rodgers, ‘Humanism’, 134. In France, too, despite the founding 
of the Collège Royal to teach Hebrew, Latin and Greek in 1530, there appears to have been a degree of 
hostility or, at least, apathy towards the Greek language; see Hume Brown, Buchanan, 63-64. 
94 Cf. Dolezalek, Jus Commune, vol.1, 5. 
95 Bolgar, Classical Inheritance, 280. 
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from Erasmus)96 through to his linking of the Turkish timariot system to the Greek noun 
τιμὴ,97 to his discussion of rhetrai near the end of his first chapter,98 Craig, as others 
have said, was ‘manifestly proud of his knowledge of Greek’;99 indeed, he rarely lets 
pass an opportunity to use a Greek or Greek-derived word in place of a Latin, a fact 
which sometimes has some unfortunate consequences.100 
 
Moving on, Craig turns to Cicero but still retains his Greek theme. He quotes 
Cicero as Cicero quotes Herodotus: ‘Not only among the Medes (as Herodotus says) 
but also among our own ancestors kings appear to have been picked from men who had 
previously been of good character so that the people might enjoy justice’.101 This line, 
too, is cited by Buchanan in his De jure regni which cannot be a coincidence.102 
Cicero’s reference is to Herodotus 1.96ff which describes how Deioces was chosen by 
the villages of his region to arbitrate their disputes and was later elected king of the 
Medes. Craig draws out this motif linking kings, judges and high character, but one 
should note that his focus continues to be on the smaller communities. He is not yet 
discussing great cities or mighty empires but rather communities that have not yet 
coalesced into anything larger than a village. Thus one can see why Craig so 
emphasised the difference between civitas and urbs in the previous section. The 
communities he is discussing are, in a sense, civitates but they are not yet large or 
populous enough to constitute true urbes. 
 
Be that as it may, Craig’s judge-kings are chosen for their good character and 
high standing in their community. In the absence of a yardstick (amussis) by which to 
measure their decisions, they must rely on a sense of natural justice which had been 
implanted in their souls by God. The keen reader of this section will notice that Craig 
emphasises fairness – aequitas and its related terms – as the qualification for and marker 
of kingship, not justice (justitia). Justice cannot yet appear in Craig’s narrative because 
justitia derives from jus but, at this stage, jus does not yet exist.103 The process of 
creating it has only just begun.104 
 
It was, in fact, a matter of supreme political and legal importance that Craig 
should not claim that laws existed before kings. James VI, in his Basilikon Doron, had 
declared that it was an act of sedition to say that laws, constitutions or parliaments 
predated kings.105 Craig’s account, though, is of a kind with that of many other writers 
                                                 
96 Δὶς διὰ πασῶν (‘twice through all’), apart from being a musical term referring to an interval of two 
octaves, is a saw signifying things separated by distance or interval and which are, by extension, 
incompatible. Erasmus explains this in detail in the Adagia 1.2.63. 
97Jus feudale, 1.4.6; in the 1655 edition, the word is incongruously given in its accusative form τιμὴν, 
though it is corrected in the 1716 and 1732 editions. 
98 Jus feudale, 1.1.14 
99 Cairns, Fergus & MacQueen, ‘Legal Humanism’ 50; the fact that Craig was proud of the Greek that 
he knew does not necessarily imply that he excelled at the language. 
100 See 1.9.22 where he uses par cheirotechnarum to mean ‘a pair of gloves’; the Greek cheirotechna  
means ‘handicraft’ which suggests that Craig took the word a little too literally and was unfamiliar with 
its standard Greek usage. 
101 Cicero, De officiis 2.41. 
102 Buchanan, De jure regni, p.50. 
103 On Craig’s approach to jus, see J. W. Cairns, ‘Ius civile in Scotland, ca.1600’, 2 Roman Legal 
Tradition (2004) 136-170 at 153-154 and Ford, Law and Opinion, 565-566. 
104 Simpson, Thomas Craig, 63-65 discusses the Calvinist theological underpinnings of this section, a 
topic to which the present author can add little.  
105 Mason, R., Kingship and the Commonweal, Edinburgh, 1998, 229. 
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of the classical and Renaissance periods who also used words describing fairness and 
equity, rather than law and justice, to describe prehistory. That being so, it would be a 
mistake to suggest that the Jus feudale was expressly adapted to suit royal views on this 
topic. Nevertheless, one cannot dismiss or ignore the fact that Craig’s focus is identical 
to that of his king, that it reflects James’ own doctrine of the crown as font of law.106 It 
may perhaps be best to explain this by saying that Craig and James VI drew upon the 
same sources, thereby reaching the same conclusions, albeit for slightly different 
philosophical and political reasons. 
 
In these days before law, Craig explains, there were no defects in judgment nor 
were there criminal penalties; all decisions of the judge-kings were correct and the 
people were restrained not by threats or punishments but by their own honour and 
natural decency in times when virtue was esteemed and vice was hated. Craig draws 
upon and cites Tacitus’ description: ‘The most ancient of mortal men acted with no evil 
desire, without disgrace or crime and therefore without penalty or punishments’.107 
However ‘after the decline of fairness, ambition and violence advanced in place of 
modesty and honour; and despotisms emerged and still exist amongst many peoples’.108  
Craig is here dependent upon Tacitus’ reception of the Hesiodic Golden Age;109 more 
significant than that, however, is the strong Christian thread running through this 
section. Craig assumes that earlier generations were more innocent (or less corrupt) 
because they were closer to the perfect Prelapsarian world (something he will discuss 
in the next section). This idea is certainly lifted directly from Augustine’s theory of the 
sex aetates or Six Ages of the world (found in the De catechizandis rudibus). Craig, 
who was raised Catholic and whose uncle was one of the foremost theologians of the 
age (as well as one of the most important religious figures in the Scottish 
Reformation),110 would certainly have been familiar with the text in particular and the 
theory in general.111 From here, however, Craig moves on to discuss the growing rôle 
and authority of the monarch. 
 
From 1.1.4 and 1.1.5, a number of significant points emerge in Craig’s vision 
of primitive monarchy. First, it is apparent that Buchanan’s De jure regni had a real 
influence on Craig. While Buchanan’s account is concerned only briefly and 
tangentially with the early societies and the emergence of law, it nevertheless acts as a 
key historical and philosophical source. Like Craig, Buchanan contends that the citizen 
who stood out most for his ‘fairness and sagacity’ (aequitate et prudentia) would be 
elected king.112 These kings were ‘established in office for the purpose of defending 
fairness’ (eum aequitatis tuendae causa in magistratu esse collocatum) but this was 
                                                 
106 Interestingly, at 1.2.12, Craig describes Roman law as the ‘font of equity’ and, at 1.8.16 described 
feudal law as the ‘source and font’ of all law in Scotland. 
107 Tacitus, Annales, 3.26. 
108 At postquam exui aequalitas, et pro modestia ac pudore, ambitio et vis incedebat, provenere 
dominationes, multosque apud populos aeternum mansere. 
109 Craig would have been familiar with Ovid’s account of the Ages of Man but the ultimate provenance 
was with Hesiod’s Erga kai Hemerai.  
110 On his uncle, see the Vita Cragii, xvi. 
111 As Peter Brown pointed out, there is considerable crossover between Christian and classical pagan 
beliefs about a decaying world made wretched by some ancient sin for which humanity as a whole must 
atone; see P. Brown, Augustine of Hippo, London, 1967, 388. This goes some way to explaining why 
Craig would have seen classical and Christian concepts of a prehistoric Golden Age as complementary 
rather than contradictory. 
112 Buchanan, De jure regni, pp.34-35. 
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eroded as kings were corrupted by their power. As with Craig, it is aequitas, not justitia, 
which makes a king.113 Buchanan, though, takes a step further and, from discussing the 
primitive monarchy’s job as an arbitrator of disputes, he passes on to cite a line from 
Cicero’s De legibus 3.2: ‘the king should be a law that speaks and the law a silent king’ 
(rex esset lex loquens, lex rex mutus).114 He further stresses the king’s rôle as judge by 
relating a tale of Philip II of Macedon who refused to hear an old woman’s case on 
grounds that he was too busy, only for the old woman to reply that if he was too busy 
to hear her case, he was too busy to be king. All of this is very similar to Craig. Kingship 
and judicial function are intertwined inexorably. Kings are chosen for their character 
and moral standing. They are protectors of their people. They solve disputes and keep 
peace within the community. But, eventually, they are corrupted and fairness declines. 
 
Yet, if there are similarities between Craig and Buchanan, there are also stark 
differences in their approaches. Where Craig gives us an essentially straightforward, 
rational and perhaps even materialistic narrative about how and why laws exist, 
Buchanan’s discussion of the same material is part of a wholesale attack on the 
(Epicurean) argument that law is a function of expediency.115 He cites the line from 
Horace that states ‘expediency herself, [is] almost the mother of the just and fair’116 and 
then goes on to refute this, simultaneously drawing upon some parts of Cicero and 
rejecting others. 
 
Buchanan has his interlocutor, Maitland, speak thus:117 
MAET. Igitur humanae societatis non tu oratorem aliquem aut iureconsultum, 
qui homines dispersos colligeret, sed ipsum Deum auctorem putas? 
 
MAIT: So you think it was not some orator or lawyer who assembled the 
scattered peoples but that God Himself was the author of human society? 
 
The comment on oratorem aliquem aut iureconsultum is, obviously, a reference to and 
rejection of Cicero’s De inventione (1.2). Cicero advanced the idea that the primitive 
world was an anarchic and violent place where ‘no-one…understood that equitable law 
might have some utility’ until a wise orator explained the advantage to people.118  
 
Buchanan replies thus: 
                                                 
113 The full citation is, neque multum referre puto rex, dux, imperator an consul vocetur qui praesit, modo 
illud teneatur, eum aequitatis tuendae causa in magistratu esse collocatum (‘I do not think it matters 
much whether the ruler is called a king, doge, emperor or consul, so long as it is borne in mind that he 
has been placed in office for the sake of preserving fairness’). Ibid., p.43. 
114 Ibid., p.45. In Cicero, the quote is magistratum legem esse loquentem, legem autem mutum 
magistratum. Mason, Kingship, 231 points out that the phrase was a commonplace in Buchanan’s day 
and that James VI used it in his True Law of Free Monarchies. 
115 Buchanan, De jure regni, p.22; see also p.28, Non quidem illam ut iusti et aequi matrem, ut quidam 
voluerunt, sed potius ancillam et civitatis bene constitutae e custodibus unam. (‘I do not see expediency 
as the mother of justice and equity, but rather as their handmaiden and one of the guardians of a well-
ordered commonwealth.’) 
116 Horace, Satires, 1.3.98, atque ipsa utilitas, iusti prope mater et aequi. Buchanan, De jure regni, p.23. 
117 Buchanan, De jure regni, p.27. 
118 Nemo…ius aequabile quid utilitatis haberet, acceperat. 
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BUCH. Ita profecto est. Ac iuxta Ciceronis sententiam nihil quidem quod in 
terris fiat principi illi Deo, qui hunc mundum regit, acceptius puto quam 
caetus hominum iure sociatos, quae civitates appellantur.119 
 
BUCH: That is correct. I think, like Cicero, that there is nothing more pleasing 
to the supreme God who rules this world than the united communities of men 
which are called states. 
 
It is fascinating that Buchanan can reject Cicero (De inventione) by citing Cicero (De 
republica). This highlights, as nothing else can, the importance of Cicero as a 
philosophical authority in the period: Buchanan is only confident in deviating from 
Cicero’s writings because he can cleave to another text of Cicero. However, neither 
Buchanan nor Cicero are the focus of this essay. From the perspective of the Jus 
feudale, the key factor is that Craig has followed Buchanan almost to the letter. Like 
Buchanan, he cites Cicero and the idea that the desire for law is innate to humanity (‘as 
Cicero rightly says, we are naturally inclined to right and fairness, and law in particular 
descends from the goodness of that very nature’).120 
 
In essence, Craig is having his cake and eating it as far as Cicero is concerned. 
The background he builds to the development of law and social contract is materialistic 
and rational; in a sense, it is Epicurean in that it holds up utility or expediency as the 
fundamental basis for human law and social relations. The entirety of the first five 
sections of the book are nothing if not an explanation of the pragmatic function of law 
and society in affording protection from external threats and an enforceable set of rules 
for interactions (particularly commercial transactions) within the community. At the 
same time, he accepts, albeit in rather bland terms, the naturalistic argument espoused 
by Buchanan. 
 
This highlights Craig’s rôle as historiographer and the purpose he envisions for 
his book: Craig is neither theologian nor philosopher; he is lawyer and historian. The 
Jus feudale is no theoretical text on the nature of law and kingship; it is an account of 
the historical development of the feudal law and its related institutions. Craig’s concern 
is not with the religio-political doctrines which might be implied by this or that 
Ciceronian theory. His concern is with the function, history and origin of the law.121 
All of this is essentially another way of saying that Craig’s approach is modelled very 
closely on that of the French Protestant humanist tradition which actively sought to 
divorce the study of history, politics and science from any theological baggage and that, 
in the process, Craig assumed a methodologically Aristotelian Weltanschauung.122  
                                                 
119 Buchanan, De jure regni, p.27. Note that this is a close paraphrase of Cicero, De republica, 6.13, nihil 
est enim illi principi deo, qui omnem mundum regit, quod quidem in terris fiat, acceptius quam concilia 
coetusque hominum iure sociati, quae civitates appellantur; harum rectores et conservatores hinc 
profecti huc revertuntur. 
120 nam, ut recte Cicero, ad jus et aequitatem naturaliter instincti sumus, et jus praecipuum ex ipsius 
naturae beneficio descendit. The print editions cite the source as De legibus de jure naturali. It is 
probably fairest to say that this sentence amounts to a loose summary of Cicero’s view of natural law 
drawing upon aspects of the De legibus (2.9-11) and the De officiis (1.58, 1.153).  
121 Mason, Kingship, 20 claims that the Scottish philosophers of the fifteenth century were political 
theologians rather than political theorists. Craig, writing at the end of the sixteenth century, represents a 
clear break with that tradition. Cf. Baird Smith, ‘Feudalist’, 279. 
122 See T. M. Parker, Christianity and the State in the Light of History, New York, 1955, 169 on Bodin 
as a figure ‘broadly Aristotelian in outlook... That is to say, Bodin conceives the State as a natural and 
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6. Jus feudale 1.1.3-1.1.5 collectively 
 
At this point, it is worth observing that within the three sections – 1.1.3-1.1.5 – Craig 
has laid out his entire view of the inception and evolution of human society. If we follow 
Augustine’s template of the sex aetates, Craig has provided a framework for 
understanding society and law during the Augustinian Second Age (that is, the period 
after the Flood but before Abraham’s arrival). For a sixteenth century Christian, this 
period can be understood as encompassing the entirety of human prehistory. 
 
The first human communities were created by families banding together in a 
kind of mutual-defence pact because, individually, they could not counter the threat 
posed by larger families. From here, they learnt to craft weapons, then to fortify their 
settlements and then to trade. With the creation of trade, they create contracts – 
unenforceable, because there is no law and hence no mechanism for enforcement – and, 
in time, they establish kings to act as judges in legal and contractual disputes. The 
foundation of monarchy, as an institution of government, represents the final step in 
creating the first human societies. Craig will, of course, talk about the evolution of 
monarchy itself (quite the hot topic in his day, following Buchanan’s De jure regni and 
James VI’s effective refutation, the Basilikon Doron)123 but, in doing so, he is talking 
not about the emergence of society but about the mechanisms by which fully-emergent 
societies are governed.124 From Craig’s perspective, the process by which human 
society is created is also the process by which people pass from lawlessness to legally 
enforceable rules. Society is law and commerce is central to the process of creating 
law.125 While the agreement of individuals to defend their community is the starting 
point for societal development, its conclusion is in an agreed structure for the 
enforcement of what Craig calls ‘these private covenants or agreements’.126  
 
We saw Craig’s explanation that people could not live within a community or 
society unless restrained in their dealings by shared and enforceable obligations. Thus 
society is law. Society is a collection of mutually binding duties and obligations placed 
upon the members of a given community and enforced by a judge. Until that point is 
reached, the ur-society has not attained its full maturity. 
 
 
7. Jus feudale 1.1.6: royal duties 
 
                                                 
necessary feature of human life and studies it upon historical lines. Political science is for him, as for 
Aristotle and Machiavelli, an inductive study with its own rules, not a department of theology’. Cf. Hume 
Brown, Buchanan, 276-277. 
123 On the continent, of course, Bodin and Hotman were also talking about it, Bodin as a monarchist and 
Hotman as a Monarchomach (or, as Baird Smith, ‘Feudalist’, 273, puts it as ‘a doctrinaire republican of 
the extreme type’). 
124 This recalls the point made by Baird Smith (ibid. 301) that Craig was ‘an historian and student of 
institutions’. 
125 Cf. JF 1.16.21 where Craig talks about the problem of debased coinage rendering  uncertain 
‘partnership, guardianship, agency, sale, lease and all the other contracts by which human society is 
encompassed’; again, law derives from the need for contractual certainty in trade and commerce. If law 
is a foundational aspect of society, then commerce is the ground on which the foundation stands. 
126 his privatis conventionibus sive pactis. (JF 1.1.4) 
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In the previous section, Craig discussed how law and monarchy were created as a means 
to settle disputes within the community. In this section, he describes their next 
evolution, solving disputes that arose with the inhabitants of neighbouring 
communities. With no means of legal redress, disputes were settled by violence which 
eventually turned into open war between communities.127 A single leader would be 
appointed to lead the community in battle: 
When the cities went out to fight in these wars, they appointed a single leader 
to whose wisdom and bravery they looked for victory and success in settling 
matters. Just as before, they followed as their leader in war the man who was 
most just and who seemed to stand out for his wisdom and other qualities, and 
this man decided what was most advantageous.128 
He goes on to say that, ‘…the institution of monarchy rested chiefly in these two duties, 
of leading the people in war and of expounding the law. These are the particular 
province of all kings and their greatest authority resides within them’.129 
 
By this point, Craig has shown the means by which disputes are resolved, 
whether between members of a given community or between neighbouring 
communities; in either case, the king’s rôle is central. The king adjudicates internal 
disputes according to what will be fairest while he leads the community to war in order 
to settle external disputes.130 In respect of this latter issue, monarchic status rests on the 
twin foundations of consilium et virtus. The latter word is particularly significant. 
 
Craig previously said that the job of judging disputes was given to vir illius 
societatis optimus (‘the best man in the community’).131 Vir, though translated simply 
as ‘man’, is not a neutral word; it is an overwhelmingly positive word which reflects 
the thoroughgoing excellence of the individual. It is, in many instances, the cognate of 
the Greek word hḗrōs (ἥρως) meaning ‘hero’. The noun embodying the state of being 
a vir is virtus, the root of the English ‘virtue’. In the context of warfare, it might be 
translated as ‘manliness’ or ‘bravery’ (as the present author has done) but its actual 
meaning is wider than can be captured by any single English word; it can describe 
decency, moral rectitude or any sense in which the individual is acting with moral 
propriety.132 Virtus is that peculiar blend of characteristics which makes a man not only 
able to judge his community fairly but worthy of doing so; it is what makes him able 
(and willing) to lead the community in war and what makes the community willing to 
follow him. However, in this context, consilium (judgment, wisdom) stands alongside 
virtus as one of the features of the vir optimus. 
 
                                                 
127 Cf. Hume Brown, Buchanan , 285, n.1: ‘Bodin, like many subsequent thinkers, thought that violence 
created society’. 
128 ad quae cum singulae civitates exirent, unum ducem sibi praeficiebant cujus consilio et virtute 
victoriam et in rebus gerendis successum spectabant; et sic qui antea justissimus erat, consilio etiam et 
sic qui antea justissimus erat, caeteris praestare visus hunc et in bello ducem sequebantur, hic quod 
commodissimum erat praescribebat. 
129 sic regum institutio in his duobus maxime constabat, in populo ad bellum educendo et reducendo et 
in jure dicundo, quae omnium regum sunt propria et in quibus eorum potissimum imperium constitit. 
130 Cf. Mason, Kingship, 191 on Buchanan’s view of the function and specific responsibilities of 
monarchy. 
131 JF 1.1.4 
132 By comparison, the Greek analogue andreios (again, literally meaning ‘manliness’) usually describes 
physical bravery, although it can carry the negative connotation of stubbornness (see Liddell and Scott 
s.v. ἀνδρεῖος). 
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Craig’s first kings were, thus, not just fair, courageous and morally upright but 
also wise and intelligent. In essence, Craig is advancing some vaguely Platonic or 
Aristotelian ideas about the nature of a king (or, rather, about the nature of the man who 
should be king); even the division of the king’s qualifications into consilium (‘wisdom’) 
and virtus (‘courage’) recalls Aristotle’s division of the intellectual virtues into sophia 
(‘wisdom’) and phronesis (‘practical intelligence’) – that is, the division between the 
theory and the practice, between the purely cerebral and the physical execution.133  
 
We can see quite clearly how Craig matches the qualities of the vir optimus to 
the duties of the rex. These early kings have little in common with later monarchs but 
are, instead, a form of public servant, wise, courageous and wholly committed to the 
good of their community. Craig’s diagram of royal virtuosity implies heavily that 
wisdom (consilium) and rectitude (virtus) are opposite sides of the same coin, that each 
derives, in some sense, from the other. To be morally upright is to be wise; to be wise 
is to be just, fair and brave. Wisdom and wickedness are thus mutually exclusive in 
Craig’s worldview. 
 
Moving on from the nature of monarchs, Craig explains that wars between 
neighbouring communities led to slavery and empire as the victor took the property, 
land and even the person of the defeated. Captives were enslaved rather than killed 
‘because the thirst for human blood had not yet sullied mankind’.134 This is another 
reminder that Craig’s treatment of prehistory is framed by his understanding of 
Augustinian theology and historiography, that he is describing the world as it existed 
after the Fall but before sin had fully taken seat in the human soul. 
For comparison, one must consider Bodin’s comments on the origins of slavery: 
What is as agreeable to reason and humanity than that you should require 
obedience and labour from those whom you have taken as your share of the 
booty in a just war, whom you have cared for and even supplied with food and 
clothing, and whom you have nurtured with the greatest charity, in return for 
such kindnesses? Is it fairer to slaughter captives cruelly? This is the first origin 
of slavery.135 
Bodin’s discussion is long, complex and replete with historical and contemporary 
instances of slavery in Europe, Asia and America. Craig’s is a single line and, unlike 
Bodin, who ultimately holds that slavery is contrary to God’s law, takes no stand on the 
morality of the issue. Even so, a connexion between the two texts is likely, especially 
in view of their shared assumption that enslaving a captive was the only alternative to 
killing him and thus the more humane option. 
 
While Craig does not explicitly state that he views slavery as a moral wrong, he 
cites the institution of slavery as the beginning of the end for human liberty. ‘The 
conquered,’ he says, ‘were reduced to the status of slaves and compelled to serve while 
                                                 
133 Simpson, Thomas Craig, 64-65 suggests that Craig may have been influenced by Plato’s Laws 
(something Baillie, the 1732 editor, also believed). My own view is that Craig is unlikely to have read 
Plato or, for that matter, Aristotle directly in Greek but could have either Latin epitomes or, as seems 
more likely, summaries of their thought in contemporary writers such as Bodin. On Aristotle’s ‘pride of 
place’ for Renaissance humanists, see Bolgar, Classical Inheritance, 277-278. 
134 nondum enim sitis humani sanguinis homines infecerat. 
135 Quid autem rationi ac humanitati tam consentaneum, quam eos, quos iusto bello ceperis parta 
victoria, servare iis etiam victum ac vestitum suppeditare, summaque caritate fovere ac pro tantis 
beneficiis obsequium et operas exigere? Num aequius illud est, quam captivos crudeliter mactare? Inde 
prima servorum origo. Bodin, De republica, p.33. 
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the victors ruled. The conquered began to live under someone else’s rule and that 
natural human liberty of living as you wish was diminished little by little’.136 It is 
difficult to construe this as an endorsement of the institution of slavery and one recalls 
Craig’s comments, drawing on Tacitus, that European serfdom was utterly different 
from slavery, that slavery was an alien practice belonging to the non-European, non-
feudal world.137 It is also hugely significant that the Latin word libertas has a more 
specific and arguably restrictive meaning than the English ‘liberty’; it describes civil 
freedom or, more exactly, an individual’s freedom to live within the constraints set 
down by law and society. By strict attention to the Latin, we can thus see that Craig 
construed slavery as something that undermined the law and that, by extension, the 
point of law is to guarantee the individual’s natural right to live as he pleased. 
 
From here, Craig has the victors in these wars debate about what their states 
should do next. They conclude that the characteristics of warfare – that is, theft, killings 
and the oppression of the weak – must not be allowed to occur within the community 
and, further, that men will not be restrained from these things solely by promises. This 
is the origin of crime and punishment. From a modern perspective, the text describes 
the beginnings of normative law. With the erosion of natural liberty, the position of the 
king is no longer just to settle disputes fairly but to enforce specific values, specific 
forms of behaviour, onto the community. This was the foundation of the jus gentium. 
In states which followed it (what Craig calls ‘states which had discerned the fair from 
the wicked’),138 good men were elected who met all of Craig’s criteria for kingship (and 
the criteria for kingship were also, in his view, the necessary criteria to be an effective 
head of a household).139 When such men measured up to the public opinion, they often 
held power for life. And thus Craig turns from the incipient monarchy to the origin of 
the hereditary principle.  
 
 
8. Jus feudale 1.1.7: hereditary monarchy 
 
In this section Craig discusses the evolution of monarchy from an elective to a 
hereditary office. The hereditary nature of monarchy was a hugely relevant topic in the 
Scotland of Craig’s day as James VI stood on the cusp of inheriting the English throne. 
It was largely to defend the heritable nature of monarchy that Craig wrote the De jure 
successionis regni Angliae in which he ‘argues strongly that kingship is not elective but 
dependent on hereditary right’.140 This section must be read within that same context. 
It serves as another instance of Craig using the ancient past to create a literary diorama 
of contemporary political issues. 
 
Hereditary kings, Craig explains, emerged because the talents and character of 
the father were often found in the son and thus, where the offspring of a virtuous 
monarch was popularly believed to share his father’s qualities, he was often treated as 
                                                 
136 at victi in servorum numerum redacti sunt, et quod imperabant victores, facere coacti et naturalis illa 
hominum libertas vivendi ut velis paulatim imminuta et alieno imperio vivere coeptum. 
137 JF, 1.4.3. 
138 in civitatibus qui aequum ab iniquo decernerent. 
139 Cf. Simpson, Thomas Craig, 65 for a comparable perspective from Bodin. 
140 Cairns, ‘Thomas Craig (?1538-1608)’. The Vita Cragii, xvi, discusses Craig’s response to ‘the Jesuit 
Parsons [who], under the assumed name Doleman, dared to attack and belittle’ James VI over his right 
to the English throne. 
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his father’s natural successor. Over time, this convention became corrupted so that 
‘when their wealth surpassed everyone else and the children were not disposed to the 
weakening of their paternal rank, the right of succession in monarchies was 
introduced’.141 
 
What Craig has done so far is to present a very broad account of how, in his 
view, the earliest states coalesced and the earliest monarchies emerged and evolved. At 
this point, however, the plane of discussion shifts to the various exceptions to the rule. 
He explains that the Medes, Persians, Lydians, Phoenicians and others were hereditary 
monarchies from their very inception, citing Aristotle as the source.142 He will go on, 
in the next section (1.1.8), to discuss the development of tyranny and those states which 
were tyrannous to begin with. 
 
Craig does not dwell on the difference between the western and Asian 
monarchies here nor does he attempt to extrapolate any broad rules. Nevertheless, the 
idea that the monarchies of the near and middle east were hereditary foundations from 
the very start (and, in the next section, that some were tyrannies, not monarchies, from 
the moment of creation) recalls the common western literary trope of Asiatic servility 
and, specifically, Buchanan’s remark in the De jure regni that ‘the peoples of Asia are 
more slavish in spirit than the Europeans, so that they accede more easily to the 
commands of tyrants’.143 While Craig does not explicitly bring up the trope of Asiatic 
servility at this point, he does discuss it at some length later in the text (1.4.3) and we 
can assume that he would have expected his readers to be aware of it and, therefore, to 
connect it with his treatment of historical Asiatic kingship. 
 
In any case, the hereditary principle, though it may have started in Asia, was 
adopted elsewhere in order to forestall the kind of civil strife that follows the death of 
a monarch. Rather than subject themselves to the problems that attend an uncertain 
succession, the successor to the king was either his firstborn or the head of the family. 
The careful reader notes that Craig here, at the end of the section, broadens his concept 
of the jus successionis from the simple primogeniture envisioned at the start into a wider 
definition that seems to imply inheritance by seniority. More importantly, this section, 
with its references to the conflicts that result from an uncertain succession, must be read 
as a warning about what will inevitably happen in England should James VI’s right to 
the English throne be rejected or challenged. 
 
 
9. Jus feudale 1.1.8: the origins of tyranny 
 
Craig begins this section by stating that his arguments thus far do not apply to the 
descendants of Ham. According to biblical narrative, Ham was one of the sons of Noah. 
He happened one day to see his father naked and drunk and told his two brothers, Shem 
and Japheth. Noah, upon waking from his drunken stupor, cursed his youngest son that 
                                                 
141cum eorum opes reliquis praeeminerent, nec facile paternae dignitatis imminutionem paterentur 
liberi, jus successionis in regnis introductum est.  
142 The print editions cite Book 1 of the Politics as the source but Aristotle does not actually say this. He 
does, however, give a short account of the origin of states at 1.1252b which is very close to what Craig 
says in 1.1.3-4. 
143 Nam, ut Asiae populi magis servili animo sunt quam Europaei, ita tyrannorum imperiis facilius 
parebant. Buchanan, De jure regni, p.145. 
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his descendants would be slaves to his brothers’ descendants.144 The story was used 
historically by all three Abrahamic faiths to justify black slavery by connecting the 
‘curse of Ham’ with black skin.145 Indeed, until 1978, the Mormon church taught that 
all black Africans were marked with Ham’s curse but could be made white through 
Christ’s saving power. For Craig, however, the sons of Ham are not African and the 
servility imposed by the curse has a different meaning. The descendants of Ham, he 
explains, live under the rule of tyrants whose monarchies were established by force and 
violence. The first of these tyrants was Nimrod, founder of the kingdom of the 
Assyrians. 
 
Craig narrates that Nimrod was called in scripture a ‘mighty hunter’,146 but 
hunters were a type of brigand and to the ancients banditry was nothing but a special 
type of hunting. The equating of hunters with brigands has no particular provenance in 
the Bible but something very similar can be found in Plato’s Nomoi.147 Ever the 
antiquarian, Craig goes on to cite Bodin who noted that the first peace treaty between 
Rome and Carthage used the word latrocinari in place of the more usual Latin phrase 
bellum gerrere. Latrocinari is the present active infinitive of the verb latrocinor and its 
meaning is twofold: it can mean ‘to perform military service for pay’;148 or it can mean 
‘to rob’.149 Etymologically the word is the verbal form of the noun latro (‘robber’, 
‘mercenary’) and the ancestor of modern Romance words like the French larron, the 
Spanish ladrón and the Italian ladro.150 The twin meaning, of theft and military service, 
presumably goes back to a time when soldiers were paid with plunder from conquered 
communities. Craig takes all this from Bodin’s Methodus,151 though Bodin’s ultimate 
source is Polybius 3.22.152 
 
In quite a topical statement, Craig states that in antiquity the term latrocinium 
(‘banditry’) was no more iniquitous than the name ‘pirate’ amongst modern nations.153 
The Jus feudale was, of course, written at the dawn of Caribbean piracy, a time when 
English, French and Dutch pirates regularly plundered Spanish shipping and colonies, 
throughout the Americas and sometimes beyond, only to be fêted as heroes in their 
home countries. As a Scot and a keen historian, Craig may also have had in mind Sir 
Andrew Barton, a high admiral of Scotland and enthusiastic privateer, who raided 
Portuguese and English shipping during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries 
but was condemned by his victims as no more than a pirate. However, while Craig 
makes the statement topical and gives it particular relevance to a British (or northern 
European) readership by relating it to piracy, it is ultimately taken from Bodin who 
                                                 
144 Genesis 9:20-27 
145 D. Goldberg, The Curse of Ham: Race and Slavery in Early Judaism, Christianity and Islam, 
Princeton, 2003, 170. 
146 Genesis 10:9. 
147 Plato, Laws 7.823. 
148 For example, Plautus, Trinummus 2.4, 598; Miles gloriosus 2.6, 499. 
149 For example, Cicero, In Catilinam 2.16, Pro Milone 17. 
150 Bodin also discusses the Hebrew equivalent of the Latin latro in De republica, p.46. 
151 Bodin, Methodus, p.195. 
152 Grotius also discusses this word and its implications; De jure belli et pacis 2.15.5. 
153 Regarding the lack of infamy attaching to latrocinium among the Germans of the first century BC, 
see Caesar, De bello Gallico 6.23, Latrocinia nullam habent infamiam, quae extra fines cuiusque civitatis 
fiunt (‘Banditry involves no disgrace, provided it takes place beyond the border of one’s state’). 
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says: ‘The ancients, such as Plato, Aristotle and Xenophon, considered banditry to be a 
type of hunting’.154 
 
The text continues that many kings had arisen from the ranks of bandits and 
hunters (‘and the mire of the worst of humanity’);155 and, following the hereditary 
principle, they passed their kingdoms on to their children. At this point, Craig illustrates 
his point by drawing upon Juvenal’s excoriating attack on Roman aristocratic 
pretensions in which the poet claims that his subject’s ancestor was a criminal who had 
gone into hiding at the Asylum of Romulus (‘the first of your ancestors, whoever that 
was, was either a shepherd or something that I’d rather not say’).156 The mention of 
Rome represents an interesting change in Craig’s tack, as he had claimed to be 
discussing the origin of kingship among the descendants of Ham (which Craig takes to 
describe various middle eastern peoples) and its difference from kingship in the rest of 
the world; thus where kings elsewhere began as fair-minded judges, Hamitic kings were 
originally brigands. However, by introducing Juvenal and Rome, who were certainly 
not Hamitic as Craig understood the term, the narrative is expanded into a subtle but 
acerbic comment on the nature of power and those who hold it. He implies that all 
rulers, whether western or Asian, ultimately derive their authority from the fact that 
their ancestors took power by force. In a sense, this a subtle response to Buchanan and 
the Monarchomachs who insisted that monarchic legitimacy and authority derive from 
the ruled. 
In any case, Craig next discusses Nimrod, the grandson of Ham (through Ham’s 
son Cush) and ‘the first to claim for himself authority over all things and who attacked 
and subdued each of his neighbours by violence and force and suppressed their liberty 
with burdens and slavery, for which he was named Nimrod (that is, amarus 
dominator)’.157 In the Jewish and Christian traditions (including that of Josephus) and 
in certain medieval Muslim narratives (though, interestingly, not in the biblical 
account),158 Nimrod led the people who built the Tower of Babel so, in a sense, Craig 
has returned to his starting point for the chapter. More importantly, however, by 
translating Nimrod as amarus dominator (‘harsh overlord’) he has revealed something 
about the sources and methodologies from which he has gathered his interpretation of 
human prehistory. 
The actual meaning of the name Nimrod (דוֹרְִמנ in the Hebrew) is unknown but, 
at some point in the early sixteenth century, amarus dominator became a common Latin 
translation and remained so until at least the mid-eighteenth century. The etymology 
appears to have originated with Johann Carion (1499-1537) whose Chronicles had such 
an important influence on continental Protestant thought. The text was later expanded, 
by Melanchthon amongst others, and translated (arguably, completely re-written) into 
Latin as the Chronicon Carionis wherein we find the earliest instance of the phrase 
                                                 
154 Bodin, De republica, p.189. 
155 Ex pessimorum hominum colluvione. 
156 Juvenal, Satires, 8.274-5. 
157  Nimrodum primum fuisse qui rerum omnium arbitrium sibi arrogaret; vi et potentia vicinos singulos 
aggressus subjecerit, oneribus et servitiis eorum libertatem oppresserit et inde Nimrod (id est amarus 
dominator) dictus est. Compare this to Bodin, De republica, p.46, testis est historia sacra, qua docemur 
Nimerodum Chami nepotem primum omnium homines sub imperium vi subiunxisse. (‘The sacred history 
is proof, from which we are taught that Nimrod, grandson of Ham, was the first ever to subjugate people 
beneath his rule by force.’) 
158 Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae, 1.4.2, seems to be the earliest literary provenance for this tradition; 
this is the same part of the text from which Craig derives his narrative of JF 1.1.2. 
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amarus dominator in a section dealing with the sons of Ham.159 The earliest instance 
of the phrase in the Latin language appears to be in a relatively obscure Late Antique 
tragedy by Dracontius, the Tragoedia Orestis, which states rex Agamemnon erat, 
patriae dominator amarus (‘Agamemnon was king, the harsh overlord of his 
country’).160 While Melanchthon is best known for his theology, he was also a talented 
scholar and teacher of the classics, particularly Vergil, so it is probable that he was 
familiar with Dracontius, whose manuscript had been known since the fifteenth century, 
and appropriated the phrase; given that Dracontius was an orthodox Roman Christian 
who lived and wrote under, and was eventually imprisoned by, Arian Vandal kings, it 
is even possible that Melanchthon saw some parallels between Dracontius’ plight and 
that of sixteenth century Protestants living under Catholic monarchs. 
 
Be that as it may, the essential point is that we can find this phrase used time 
and again in sixteenth century Latin texts. Flinspach’s Genealogiae Christi gives 
amarus dominator as the meaning of Nimrod,161 as does Walter Raleigh’s History of 
the World which cites Melanchthon as the source.162 Indeed, the translation of Nimrod 
as amarus dominator was common enough that the Dutch jurist Giphanius – or Hubert 
van Giffen – was nicknamed amarus dominator by students at the University of Altdorf, 
where he taught law between 1583 and 1590, for his vitriolic and domineering attitude 
to those whom he taught.163 Simpson rightly observes that the 1560 Geneva Bible, 
which may have been known to Craig, mentions the translation amarus dominator but 
the more likely source is a Latin humanist text.164 Craig’s understanding of Nimrod – 
in fact, his whole understanding of law, history, language and religion – derived from 
and was steeped in the learning of continental humanists and the Jus feudale was a 
conduit by which the humanist literary and cultural product was introduced to Scotland. 
 
In the De republica, Bodin, very interestingly, does not use amarus dominator. 
Instead, he states dictus est Nimerodus, id est dominus metuendus (‘He was called 
Nimrod, that is “terrifying lord”’).165 In the Methodus, he says that Nimrod ‘is described 
as a strong hunter by Moses, by which word he described all kinds of bandits and 
wicked men’ but otherwise gives no etymology or definition for the name.166 It is most 
likely that Bodin used a non-Latin source, possibly the original German edition of 
Carion’s Chronicles or a French translation thereof, while the other humanists were 
drawing upon Melanchthon’s expanded Latin version of Carion. The result, 
predictably, would be that these other authors utilised Melanchthon’s amarus 
dominator where Bodin translated the German or French directly into Latin and arrived 
at dominus metuendus. It is quite surprising that Craig did not use Bodin’s etymology 
                                                 
159 Chronicon Carionis (p.20 of the 1601 Bern edition or p.35 of the 1559 Basel edition). 
160 Dracontius, Orestis Tragoedia, 2.410; cf. A. M. Wasyl, Genres Rediscovered: Studies in Latin 
Miniature Epic, Love Elegy and Epigram of the Romano-Barbaric Age, Krakow, 2011, 65-74 but esp. 
70. On Dracontius generally, see F. Raby, A History of Christian-Latin Poetry, Oxford, 1966, 95-100. 
161 Flinspach, Genealogae Christi et omnium populorum tabulae, Basil, 1567, 202. 
162 Raleigh, History of the World, 1.10.2 (p.158 in the 1614 London edition). This is not to imply that 
Raleigh was Craig’s source – particularly given that Raleigh’s text was not published until after Craig’s 
death – but rather to underscore that Melanchthon was being read and cited by insular humanist scholars. 
163 W. Mährle, Academia Norica: Wissenschaft und Bildung an der Nürnberger Hohen Schule in Altdorf 
(1575-1623), Stuttgart, 2000, 152. 
164 Simpson, Thomas Craig, 72; note that the Basel Chronicon was published the year before the Geneva 
Bible which indicates an earlier provenance for the phrase amarus dominator. 
165 Bodin, De republica, p.189. 
166 Nimerodus...a Mose robustus venator appellatur, quo verbo latrones ubique et sceleratos homines 
appellavit, Bodin, Methodus, p.270. 
29 
 
of Nimrod. Looking closely at Bodin’s account of Nimrod’s origins, we can see that 
Craig’s dependence on the French text is far greater than his passing references to Bodin 
might suggest: ‘It is obvious and convincing to everyone that the first of all monarchies 
was constituted in Assyria by King Nimrod whom the Holy Scriptures called the most 
powerful hunter, a common figure of speech amongst the Hebrews by which they 
intended to signify that he was a bandit’.167 
 
So, as we see, not only is the motif of the first Hamitic kings being bandits 
imported from Bodin but so too is the concept of banditry as a form of hunting. In fact, 
this entire section is effectively a very close adaptation of Bodin with Craig’s 
contribution being limited to the introduction of Juvenal and Rome. Bodin’s account 
also states that ‘Before the age of Nimrod, everyone’s liberty was equal’.168 This recalls 
Craig’s remark, at the end of section 1.1.6, that military conquest marked the end of 
human liberty. We can safely assume that Craig adapted this sentence from Bodin’s to 
suit his own concern with the wider (i.e. non-Hamitic) origins of law and society. 
 
Moving on, Craig’s text says that Nimrod gathered hunters ‘who, like himself, 
were oppressors of other people’s liberty’ and thereby established the Assyrian 
kingdom.169 The other empires of antiquity – the Egyptians, Lydians and Persians – 
were likewise founded upon violence. This, Craig explains, makes sense even if one is 
completely ignorant of history because ‘the stronger are accustomed to take everything 
for themselves, to despoil, murder and conquer weaker people and to drive them into 
slavery’.170 So, in effect, Craig is saying that degeneration to the Hamitic standard of 
tyranny is inevitable for all humans, that the principal difference between them and the 
descendants of Shem and Japheth is that the descendants of Ham were subject to 
tyranny from the very beginning while all the other nations had to devolve to that point. 
This interpretation is reinforced by section 1.1.3 where Craig explained that the earliest 
communities were organised by the weak to provide mutual defence against stronger 
clans. The stronger clans were not specifically Hamitic, so Craig’s argument is that this 
is a universal, not merely Hamitic or Asian, phenomenon. 
 
Having established their empires, the Hamitic kings abandoned even ‘natural 
liberty’ by subduing their most outstanding generals. The idea that kings would strike 
down those whose power or reputation posed a threat was a common motif in antiquity 
and can be found in Herodotus and Aristotle. Both tell the story of how Thrasybulus, 
tyrant of Miletus, sent a messenger to the Corinthian tyrant Periander asking how to 
rule; Periander responded by taking the messenger to a field of wheat and decapitating 
the tallest stalks – the implication being to remove all outstanding individuals as they 
might prove powerful enough to pose a threat.171 This story was probably known to 
                                                 
167 cum omnibus persuasum sit ac perspicuum monarchiam omnium primam in Assyria fuisse constitutam 
Nimerodo Principe quem sacrae literae potentissimum venatorem appellant loquendi genus Hebraeis 
familiare quo verbo latronem singificari volunt. Bodin, De republica, p.187. 
168Ante Nimerodi aetatem, aequa erat omnium libertas. (Ibid.) 
169 Nactusque multos sui similes venatores alienae libertatis oppressores, regni Assyriorum prima 
constituit initia. 
170 Fortiorem omni sibi solitum arrogare, infirmiores spoliare, caedere, subjicere sibi et in servitutem 
adigere. 
171 Herodotus 5.92 and Aristotle, Politics, 3.1284a. Aristotle, however, states that this is a policy pursued 
not only by tyrants but by democrats and oligarchs as well. He specifically cites the Athenian policy of 
ostracism as a variant but he may have in mind the execution of Socrates following the restoration of 
democracy after the Tyranny of the Thirty. 
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Craig through one ancient source or another but, even if not, it is related by Bodin in 
the Methodus and must have been in Craig’s mind when he wrote this section.172 
 
 
10. Jus feudale 1.1.9: the difference between a tyrant and a monarch 
 
This section deals with a very hot topic of Craig’s day, the distinction between a 
legitimate monarch and an illegitimate tyrant. Even in violent societies where 
oppression and enslavement were the norm, there were still rights and laws; Craig 
explains that even bandits enforced rules on proper behaviour, ‘otherwise, as Cicero 
says, there would be no fellowship between them’.173 These laws, however, depended 
upon the whim of the king. As the most powerful man in the group, the king’s 
commands were law and Craig supports this with a reference to Livy saying ‘amongst 
the barbarians, the commands of kings took the place of laws’.174 A very similar remark 
can be found in Buchanan’s De jure regni apud Scotos which says libido regum pro 
legibus esset,175 and in Bodin’s De republica which says Livius scribit barbaris...pro 
legibus semper dominorum imperia fuerunt (‘Livy writes that, for barbarians, the 
commands of their lords always took the place of laws’).176 It is certain that Craig had 
read Bodin on this point, but he probably also drew upon Buchanan, which should be 
unsurprising as the De jure regni would be a natural source for any Scot of the period 
interested in the topic of tyranny.177 
 
The king, as the only source of authority in his domain, appointed deputies to 
govern and dispense justice in his stead. He provided them with written provisions to 
follow both to ensure that justice would be dispensed fairly and because he wished to 
constrain his satraps lest they become too powerful and usurp the throne. The fact that 
Craig describes the king’s deputies using the Persian word satrap, meaning ‘viceroy’, 
reinforces the idea that he is speaking about Persia and, in all likelihood, the near east 
generally rather than making a universal rule applicable to Europe. In any case, ‘these 
were the first foundations of tyranny’,178 for while tyrants provided written guidance to 
their judges, the tyrants themselves were unrestrained by any law or statute and any 
complicated or controversial judgment by a deputy had to be made in accordance with 
the king’s wishes and after consulting the king ‘so that ultimately they directed the law 
to suit the king’s pleasure and advantage’.179  
                                                 
172 Bodin, Methodus, p.216. 
173 Ut ait Cicero...alioqui nulla esset inter eos societas. This is not a direct quotation from Cicero, though 
the 1732 edition and Clyde treat it as such. Rather, it is a close paraphrase of De officiis 2.40, Quin etiam 
leges latronum esse dicuntur, quibus pareant, quas observent…. Cicero goes on to give specific 
examples of bandits who were known for their fairness in dealing with other bandits. 
174Apud barbaros regum imperia pro legibus sunt. The reference is to Ab urbe condita 37.54, which says 
barbari, quibus pro legibus semper dominorum imperia fuerunt, quo gaudent, reges habeant (‘Let the 
barbarians have kings, for to them the commands of their lords have always taken the place of laws, 
something in which they delight’).  
175 Buchanan, De jure regni, p.44. 
176 Bodin, De republica, p.190. Note that Bodin is actually quoting Livy where the others are merely 
paraphrasing him. 
177 Hume Brown, Buchanan, 287, n.1 observes that Buchanan and Bodin shared an interest in tyrannicide 
and kingship. These topics were obviously not Craig’s primary concern, but the centrality of Bodin and 
Buchanan to his narrative meant that he could not avoid treating the issues that they discussed. 
178 Haec itaque prima erant tyrannidis fundamenta. 
179 Ad cujus libidinem et commoda jus illud qualaecunque tanquam ad finem dirigebant. 
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So, while these primitive states were subject to a form of law, it was wholly 
dependent on the whim of whichever man happened to be strong enough to enforce his 
will on everyone else, ‘men who believed that because they were stronger everything 
was owed to them and who oppressed the people gravely’.180 Craig goes on to explain 
that ‘in this, legitimate monarchy can be distinguished from tyranny: the tyrant looks 
only to his own advantage and profit and is unconcerned about condition and well-
being of his own people, while the true monarch disregards his own well-being and 
profit in favour of the well-being and advantage of the people’.181 This is redolent of 
Bodin’s remark that ‘it is tyranny if the prince arrogantly abuses people’s property, 
nature’s law and the goods and liberty of subjects for his own caprice’.182 By itself, one 
might excuse this as coincidence but it is found on a page which Craig has clearly read 
thoroughly (and borrowed from extensively), so we must characterise Craig’s 
description of the difference between tyranny and legitimate monarchy as ultimately an 
expansion of Bodin’s thoughts. Indeed, Craig finishes this section by comparing the 
legitimate monarch to Codrus, a mythical king of Athens and a key part of the city’s 
civic mythology during the classical period. According to the Attic orator Lycurgus in 
his only extant speech, Athens was attacked in the ancient past by a Dorian army who 
had received an oracle at Delphi stating that they would conquer the city provided they 
did not harm the Athenian King. When Codrus heard this, he disguised himself, went 
to the Dorian encampment and provoked a fight during which he was killed. Lycurgus 
invokes Codrus alongside the daughters of Erechtheus as a paragon of patriotic (and 
royal) self-sacrifice.183 This story is recounted in detail in Bodin’s De republica (and 
in passing in his Six livres de la République).184 
 
Thus, in its entirety, Craig’s conceptualisation of the tension between legitimate 
royal authority and tyranny is actually Bodin’s conceptualisation. Even to the extent 
that Craig may be drawing upon some other source, such as Buchanan, they are 
ultimately drowned out by the sheer intellectual hegemony that Bodin exercises over 
Craig’s understanding of sovereignty and authority;185 indeed, other than to the extent 
that they endorse Bodin’s view, Craig seems to have minimal use for other sources. At 
the same time, Craig does not expressly state that he is presenting a narrative which is 
founded upon Bodin’s work, something which may reflect a desire on Craig’s part to 
minimise the appearance of dependence on other parties or which may simply show 
that he expected his readers to be able to recognise the shadow which Bodin cast over 
the Jus feudale. 
 
 
11. Jus feudale 1.1.10: state, society and the Jews 
 
                                                 
180 Qui sibi, quod fortiores essent, omnia deberi putabant, multitudinem graviter opprimebant. 
181In hoc enim principatus legitimus a tyrannide dignoscitur, quod tyrannus sua tantum commoda et 
utilitates spectet, de populi sui statu et salute securus; verus autem princeps suam salutem et suas 
utilitates populi saluti et commodis postponat. 
182Tyrannis denique si princeps imperiose spretis gentium ac naturae legibus subditorum bonis ac 
libertate ad libidinem abutatur. Bodin, De republica, p.189. 
183 Lycurgus Kata Leokratous 84-87. The same tale is told in a number of sources but Lycurgus is the 
earliest version and was included in Manutius’ 1508 compendium of Attic orators, upon which Bodin 
almost certainly drew. 
184 Bodin, De republica, p.200. 
185Cf. Cairns, Fergus & MacQueen, ‘Legal Humanism’, 55 
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Having disposed of the descendants of Ham, Craig proceeds to discuss the descendants 
of Shem, by which Craig means the progeny of Abraham and thus the Jews. He explains 
that Abraham and his descendants were nomadic and had neither laws nor contracts; 
though extremely wealthy, that wealth was measured in cattle.186 During the time of the 
Patriarchs (that is, Abraham and his son Isaac and grandson Jacob), ‘not only had 
Natural Law grown in strength, but the Law of Nations had been further consolidated 
and perfected; kingdoms and empires were being founded at that time and communities 
and civil agreements were being implemented’.187 The concept of private property 
emerged during this same period, as did the laws of war, whereby, and according to 
scripture, any man who took something in war acquired a lawful right to it.188 Finally, 
laws of slavery and manumission and contracts of sale, hire and loan emerged and, 
ultimately, laws on succession and wills, examples of which, Craig assures us, can be 
found in Genesis along with penalties for wrongdoing and rewards for the good. 
 
The interesting thing about this, certainly from the perspective of the 
development of law and society, is that Craig makes no attempt to explain why, how, 
where or when these laws came about. We leap from a period when the ancient Jews 
were nomadic and lawless through to the period of the Patriarchs when laws existed. 
The Jews had no laws and then they did; these laws are presented to the reader as a fait 
accompli requiring no exposition. Given that the Jus feudale generally makes a point 
of exploring the origins and development of law, this apparent omission demands 
explanation. The most likely issue here is Craig’s lack of useful source material. Bodin, 
one of his favourite modern sources, seems not to touch upon Abraham or the pre-
Mosaic Jews at all. Craig’s source of last resort, so to speak, is therefore the Bible itself 
and so he provides a basic recounting of Genesis in which no explanation of the 
development of law is to be found. This is as good an illustration as any of Craig’s 
dependence on his source material and, perhaps, a demonstration of his limitations in 
spheres not directly related to the practice of law. 
 
Moving on, the point is made that oral laws provided no real deterrent to 
criminality. This is a theme to which Craig returns at various points – the need for law 
to be set down in order to ensure that it is publicly available and that no-one therefore 
commits a crime through ignorance. In place of written law, good men, ‘or those 
believed to be such, through the opinion or error of the people’,189 dispensed justice. 
He then recounts another Old Testament story, this time one of the sister-wife 
narratives. When Abraham arrived in Gerar, he identified his wife Sarah as his sister, 
whereupon the king, Abimelech, took her for his own. That night God sent the king a 
dream revealing Sarah’s identity and warning that Abimelech would be killed if he 
violated her. The king responded that Abraham had deceived him and therefore his own 
conscience was clear. God agreed with this but told him to restore Sarah to Abraham. 
Abimelech did so but not before rebuking Abraham for unjustly bringing God’s anger 
down upon Gerar. Abraham explained that he feared he would be killed by the men of 
Gerar because there was no fear of God in that land.190 As Craig puts it, Abraham 
                                                 
186 From a Scottish, and particularly Highland perspective, many people in Craig’s own day might have 
measured wealth in the same terms as the ancient Jews. 
187 Non solum jus naturae sive naturale valuisse certum est, sed jus etiam gentium constitutum et 
absolutum fuit; nam regna et imperia tum erecta, societates et civiles conventiones contrahebantur. 
188 Genesis 48-49. 
189 Aut qui ex opinione aut errore vulgi tales credebantur. 
190 Genesis 20:5-11. 
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‘trusted not laws, which did not then exist, nor the rights of hospitality but only the fear 
of God on which alone commonwealths rested’.191 
 
Traditional Jewish interpretation is based around the idea (not actually found in 
the text) that Abimelech broke the rules of hospitality by immediately asking if Sarah 
was married. Christian interpretation tends to focus more on the moral lapse when 
Abraham, an otherwise ideal figure, lies from fear. Craig’s use of anecdote is to 
illustrate the problem that arises when social order derives not from written law but 
from royal commandments. A king, as the ultimate power in the community, answered 
to no-one and was therefore restrained solely by his own sense of decency. Only timor 
Dei – the fear that even a king’s transgressions will be punished – can guarantee that 
the king will act justly. 
 
Craig explains that devout impulses had remained in Abraham’s descendants 
even after the Fall and that, with no fixed laws, rights or homes, it was this divine spark 
that provided the foundation for law and governance amongst them. However, to 
illustrate this contention, he cites a line from the pagan poet Ovid, ‘They cultivated faith 
and fairness willingly and without law’.192 Ovid was describing the classical pagan 
view of the Golden Age of Man and, indeed, Craig extends his use of Ovid by 
borrowing the term aurea aetas (‘golden age’) to describe this period as the ‘first and 
truly golden age of the Patriarchs’.193 Despite using the pagan Golden Age in this way, 
Craig prefaces his quotation of Ovid by saying, ‘even after the fall of the first man, 
Adam, some remaining element of the divine breath brought forth those devout 
impulses of the soul in the descendants of Abraham’.194 The phrase in Abrahami familia 
produxerat seems to function as a reductive statement; it implies that these divine 
impulses were not found in all people – certainly not in the Hamitic peoples, about 
whom Craig has written, and apparently not in the ancestors of the non-Semitic Greeks 
and Romans, nor even in all Semitic peoples – but only in the blood descendants of 
Abraham, the first Jew. Jewish society is thus founded upon timor Dei and ‘devout 
impulses of the soul’. Yet this cannot be Craig’s meaning because, immediately after, 
he states that the descendants of Abraham ‘departed in no way from Natural Law, or 
from the laws of other nations, except in the worship of God’.195 Thus, the laws of 
Jewish and non-Jewish nations are the same, except in matters of religion. If law owes 
its origin to some divine spark in the human soul, that spark was found equally in Jews 
and non-Jews. Similarly, Craig stated that commonwealths rested solely upon timor Dei 
and yet recognised the existence of societies where the Abrahamic god was not 
worshipped.  We must therefore interpret his comments broadly as describing fear not 
of the biblical god but of divine judgment and retribution in a more general sense. It 
may be significant that Craig earlier referred to Minos and Rhadamanthus who, 
according to Plato’s pagan, sat in judgment of wrongdoers in the afterlife.196 The 
parallels between this and the Judeo-Christian concept of judgment in the afterlife could 
not have escaped Craig. 
                                                 
191 Non leges, quae tum nullae erant, non jura hospitalia praetexuit, sed tantum timor Dei, quo solo tum 
respublicae stabant, proposuit. 
192Sponte sua sine lege fidem rectumque colebant. Ovid, Metamorphoses 1.90. 
193 Illa prima et vere aurea aetate patriarcharum. 
194 Siquidem post lapsum Adae protoplasti, divinae tantum aurae particula adhuc relicta pios illos 
animorum motus in Abrahami familia produxerat. 
195 Ita tamen ut a jure naturali nunquam discederent, a jure aliarum gentium nisi in Dei cultu raro. 
196 Plato, Apologia 41A. 
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The similarity of Jewish and non-Jewish society is reinforced when Craig goes 
on to describe the emergence of kingship among the Jews. Echoing his earlier treatment 
of kingship in non-Jewish societies, he explains that a single leader was appointed who 
would judge matters, issue decrees and convene the community. In time, the people 
started to call him the king but that term was not an indicator of monarchic sovereignty 
so much as a title of respect, something Craig illustrates by recounting a line from the 
Punica of Silius Italicus where Scipio is named rex, or king, by the Spaniards because 
‘they undoubtedly considered this the highest badge of virtue’.197 The evolution of 
Jewish kingship is explained by reference to a Roman account of kingship among the 
Spaniards because, as Craig understood it, the evolution of ancient Jewish society was 
interchangeable with that of any non-Jewish (and non-Hamitic) society. 
 
From here, Craig makes an interesting digression. He notes that the absence of 
laws and judicial punishment in prehistoric times is made clear by Homer because, in 
all his books, the word ‘law’ is not to be found. This is factually correct. The Greek 
word for law, nomos, is found nowhere in the Iliad or Odyssey although dikê (‘justice’) 
does put in a few appearances and the verb nemein (‘to distribute’), the etymological 
source of nomos, also appears. However, the argument is not Craig’s; it is lifted directly 
from Bodin’s Methodus which says ‘Homer, in his great work, nowhere employed the 
word nomos’.198 This is indicative of Craig’s general lack of familiarity with Greek 
texts and his reliance on secondary sources to fill the interpretational gap; but, from the 
perspective of Craig’s argumentation, the larger point is that he treats Homeric Greek 
society as interchangeable with the world of the Old Testament. The position of kings, 
both Homeric and Jewish, is explained thus:  ‘Homer lived one hundred and sixty years 
after the fall of Troy and, at that time, a king was nothing other than popular authority 
or armed justice’,199  a conclusion that is reminiscent of Buchanan’s assertion that a 
ruler, whatever title he went by, existed for the purpose of upholding the law.200 
 
 
12. Jus feudale 1.1.11: the codification of law 
 
This section is quite short and provides an orthodox explanation of the earliest 
codification of law. The golden age of human morality passed and wickedness took its 
place; virtuous judges were replaced by wealthy men who showed partiality to members 
of their own social class and prejudice against the poor. Faced with inconsistent 
verdicts, communities demanded that the law be set down in writing ‘so that it would 
speak consistently with a single voice to all people’.201 Craig follows this with an 
extended quotation from Cicerio’s Pro Cluentio in which the orator detailed the 
characteristics of the ideal judge.202 The quotation explains that a judge is permitted 
only a specified amount of authority, that he must not overstep his bounds and that 
authority has been vouchsafed him on the understanding that he can acquit those whom 
                                                 
197 Scilicet hunc summam norant virtutis honorem. Silius Italicus, Punica 16.281.Norant is rendered 
norunt (contracted form of noverunt) in modern editions of the text. 
198 Homerus in opere tanto νόμον verbum nusquam usurparit. Bodin, Methodus, p.183. 
199 Vixit autem Homerus centum et sexaginta annos post captam Trojam; nec rex aliud tum erat nisi 
publica potentia aut armata justitia. 
200 Buchanan, De jure regni, p.43. 
201 ut idem omnibus uno ore loqueretur. 
202 Cicero, Pro Cluentio 58. 
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he hates and condemn those whom he likes, making judgments on the basis of law and 
piety. 
 
The comment about judicial partiality towards the wealthy recalls the De officiis 
where Cicero explained that the first judges (and thus kings) were created to ensure that 
the poorer classes should not be oppressed by the wealthy.203 The insistence of the 
people on fair and equitable treatment, and their attempts use law to guarantee it, also 
reflects the influence of the De officiis; in fact, the desire for the law to ‘speak 
consistently with a single voice to all people’ is a slight re-working of Cicero’s own 
phrase leges sunt inventae, quae cum omnibus semper una atque eadem voce 
loquerentur (‘laws were invented, which then spoke to all people at all times with one 
and the same voice’).204 
 
Craig was certainly very familiar with the De officiis, so its influence should be 
assumed to be direct. Having said that, it is worth noting that Buchanan quotes these 
same sections of De officiis at length;205 this comes shortly after Buchanan’s own 
discussion of the reasons for the codification of law. His account is similar to Craig’s 
but harsher and much more explicit in that it is talking about kings and not just 
magistrates: 
 One ought always to bear in mind what we said at the start, that kings were 
 first established for the purpose of upholding fairness. Had they held to that, 
 they would have been able to maintain the power they received forever, that is 
 free and unrestrained by laws. But, as in all human matters, the state of affairs 
 degenerated into something worse and authority which was established for the 
 public good turned into arrogant domination. For, when the licence of kings 
 took the place of laws and these men collectively would not temper their 
 limitless and unbridled power, but instead indulged their own friendships, 
 hatreds and personal interests, the insolence of kings made a necessity of 
 laws.206 
While Craig has specifically discussed the corruption of judges, we must recall 
that his narrative, informed as it is by Ciceronian thought, treats kings as no more than 
a type of judge. So when Craig talks about the partiality and injustice of judges, he is 
actually talking about the failures of kings. He does not say so explicitly, does not use 
the word rex, but he nevertheless shares Buchanan’s theme of royal high-handedness 
and of laws arising to constrain the monarchy. This, in a way, represents a certain 
friction between the text as Cicero wrote it and its interpretation by sixteenth-century 
Scots. 
 
For Cicero, writing under the late republic, kings were figures from the distant 
historical and mythological past. He could therefore write of the relationship between 
kings, judges, corruption and written law without any particular political implication; 
                                                 
203 Cicero, De officiis 2.41. 
204 Ibid. 2.42. 
205 Buchanan, De jure regni, pp.50-51. 
206 Illud igitur quod initio diximus tenere semper oportet, reges primum tuendae aequitati fuisse 
constitutos. Id illi si tenere potuissent, imperium quale acceperant tenere perpetuo potuissent, hoc est 
liberum et legibus solutum. Sed (ut humana sunt omnia), statu rerum in pejus prolabente, quod publicae 
utilitatis causa fuerat constitutum imperium in superbam dominationem vertit. Nam cum libido regum 
pro legibus esset, hominesque in potestate infinita et immoderata collocati sibi non temperarent, sed 
multa gratiae, multa odiis, multa privatis commoditatibus indulgerent, regum insolentia legum fecit 
desiderum. Buchanan, De jure regni, p.44. 
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in fact, for any good Roman republican, the act of writing about the arrogance of kings 
and the need to constrain them with codified law was a reinforcement of Roman civic 
ideology – after all, the republic had been founded by driving out an arrogant king who 
ruled as a tyrant.207 Matters were less simple for a Renaissance Scot, living under the 
Stuart monarchy and particularly for Craig living under an adult James VI jealous of 
any challenge to his monarchic authority but facing an unprecedented ‘constitutional 
crisis’ that revolved ultimately around the question of where sovereignty lay.208  The 
values of the Roman republic, as voiced by Cicero, could bring one into sharp conflict 
with Stuart monarchic ideology. It was as a consequence of just such a conflict that all 
copies of Buchanan’s own De jure regni apud Scotos were ordered, on pain of a £200 
fine, to be surrendered to the Privy Council so that they might be ‘purgit of the offensive 
and extraordinare materis’.209 In time, James penned The True Law of Free Monarchies 
in 1598 and the Basilikon Doron in 1599 to refute Buchanan’s Monarchomachic 
ideology and establish a literary and theoretical foundation for his own ideology of 
monarchic absolutism.210 
 
Buchanan openly advocated the assassination of tyrants (a term which, in this 
sense, appears to mean any monarch who fails to uphold the duties placed upon him by 
the people or who acts outside the bounds of law and reason) and championed some 
form of popular sovereignty.211 Thus, he was advancing an ideology that he knew 
would bring him into conflict with the monarchy, in the form of his pupil, James VI. 
Craig shared none of these beliefs with Buchanan and, in fact, can broadly be described 
as a Stuart loyalist.212 His intent in writing this section was to state, as anodyne fact, 
that kings had originally been appointed by the people to fill a specific judicial function 
and that some kings had failed in that rôle. As a result of this failure, laws were created 
to bind monarchs. It is not likely that James VI was offended by Craig’s statements; 
indeed, in his 1610 speech to the English parliament, James acknowledged that the 
difference between tyranny and legitimate monarchy rested on royal obedience to the 
law.213 However, this whole section, when read alongside Buchanan, illustrates the 
                                                 
207 The last king of Rome, Tarquinius Superbus or Tarquin the Arrogant, provoked a revolution by raping 
a virgin who later killed herself. The motif that sexual excess was a marker of tyranny is something to 
be found in much of Buchanan’s historical work. See Mason,) 193. 
208 Mason, Kingship, 195. 
209 T. Thomson and C. Innes, eds., Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland 1424-1707, 12 vols., Edinburgh, 
1814-1875, vol.3, 296. 
210 G. Burgess, Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution, London, 1996, 42 and 96-102 argues that 
James VI was not an absolutist but simply believed in divine right while simultaneously recognising the 
legal limits of his own authority. Cf. J. Somverille, ‘King James VI and I and John Selden’, in D. Fischlin 
and M. Fortier, eds., Royal Subjects: Essays on the Writings of James VI and I, Detroit, 2002, 290-322. 
B. P. Levack, ‘Law, sovereignty and the union’, in R. Mason, ed., Scots and Britons Scottish Political 
Thought and the Union of 1603, Cambridge, 1994, 213-238 claims ‘it is possible to locate Craig within 
a tradition of emerging absolutist thought’ (229), a claim which, in the present author’s opinion, 
misunderstands the feudal theory underpinning Craig’s discourse on sovereignty and monarchy. 
211 R. Mason, ‘Rex Stoicus: George Buchanan, James VI and the Scottish polity’ in J. Dwyer, R. Mason, 
and R. Murdoch, eds.,  New Perspectives on the Politics and Culture of Early Modern Scotland, 
Edinburgh, 1982, 9-33. 
212 Indeed, his second son, Sir James, died fighting for the Stuarts against Irish rebels in 1641 while his 
third son, John, became physician to James VI and archiater to Charles I; see Vita Cragii, xviii. 
213As Mason, Kingship, 238, says, James I of England was less an absolutist than James VI of Scotland. 
Cf. I. Ward, Law and Literature: Possibilities and Perspectives, Cambridge, 1995, 64-65 where James, 
whatever the theories of absolutism he may have advanced in writing, was still less an absolutist than the 
Tudors monarchs. Further, K. Sharpe, Reading Authority and Representing Rule in Early Modern 
England, London, 2013, 38 noted a certain degree of insecurity on the king’s part about the reception his 
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tension that existed in the Scottish Renaissance reception of classical thought on the 
topic of monarchy and tyranny. Classical writers such as Cicero were recounting the 
values of their time, the values of their culture and society, but such values were 
potentially problematic in a Scotland, and indeed in a Europe, where political radicals 
were challenging the legitimacy of established monarchies. The brevity of this section 
of the Jus feudale may reflect Craig’s discomfort with the topic and his desire to recount 
it in as short and uncontroversial a fashion as possible, to downplay the troublesome 
republicanism which might shine through from the De officiis and to dissociate himself 
and his text from contemporary political conflicts, hence Craig speaks of the corruption 
of judges as a class where Buchanan speaks of the corruption of kings specifically. 
Similarly, Craig introduces an extended quotation from Cicero about the characteristic 
of the ideal judge precisely because he wishes to keep his dialogue focused on the law 
and its ancient origins, not on issues relating to sovereignty or political power in 
contemporary Scotland. 
 
This short section, if it serves any purpose for a modern reader, shows the 
conflicting ways in which classical authority could be construed for rhetorical or 
literary purposes and the issues attending those who tried to employ potentially 
controversial texts in broadly uncontroversial ways. 
 
 
13. Jus feudale 1.1.12: the utility of written law 
 
This section, standing as a justification of written law, is a great deal more important 
than its length would suggest. Written law, for Craig, was the marker of developed legal 
system and he often lamented Scotland’s lack of written law,214 just as he lamented the 
absence of an educational infrastructure for the teaching of law in Scotland.215 Indeed, 
Craig describes the Jus feudale as no more than an attempt to reduce Scottish forensic 
practice (‘which is widely considered to be vague and uncertain’) to a fixed and 
accessible order.216 That being so, this section stands as a form of apologia for the 
writing of the Jus feudale and as an explanation of the project’s worth for a 
predominantly Scottish readership to whom the idea of setting down native legal 
authority in writing was a great innovation.217 
 
The treatment of written law’s utility begins by returning to Cicero and the ideal 
judge. Since there will always be a dearth of morally perfect judges, the ancients solved 
the matter by compelling judges to draw from fixed, written laws and regulations rather 
than from personal whim. Such was the genesis of written law. However, Craig adds a 
very particular perspective by observing that there is no judge so upright and so just 
                                                 
literary works (including not only The True Law of Free Monarchies but also his Counterblast to 
Tobacco) would receive from an independent and generally distrustful public. 
214 E.g., JF 1.2.14, 1.8.5, 1.8.9, etc. 
215 JF 1.2.14; the oldest chair of civil law in Scotland is that of Edinburgh, founded in 1710. By happy 
coincidence, its first occupant was James Craig, great-great-grandson of Thomas (see Baillie’s Vita 
Cragii for genealogical details). Before that, however, there had been a royal lectureship in law in 
Edinburgh in the 1550s and an ‘abortive scheme’ for a chair of law (see Cairns, Fergus & MacQueen, 
‘Legal Humanism’ 41) and there is some evidence that civil and canon law were taught at Glasgow as 
early as the 1450s; see W. Gordon, ‘Roman Law in Scotland’, in R. Evans-Jones, ed., The Civil Law 
Tradition in Scotland, Edinburgh, 1995, 13-40 at 19. 
216 Quod vagum et incertum a plerisque creditur. Epistola nuncupatoria (p.viii of the 1732 edition). 
217 On Craig and the written law – or jus scriptum – of the kingdom, see Cairns, ‘Ius Civile’, 154ff. 
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that his judgments will always be fair; in a foreshadowing of Acton’s saw about power 
and corruption, Craig says no judge has such personal probity that his power need not 
be tempered ‘for unrestrained power leads even good men into wickedness’.218 
 
Various sources are then adduced to support this contention. The author cites 
Aristotle who ‘famously said that those who wish the law to be sovereign over the state 
would prefer God to be sovereign; those who wish a man to be sovereign over the state 
would place a beast in command’.219 This is an approximate summary of some of 
Aristotle’s ideas about law’s capacity to restrain the worst human impulses.220 The idea 
that external physical and emotional stimuli will corrupt even good men, something 
which clearly influences Craig’s thought, is to be found in the Nicomachean Ethics.221 
It can be assumed that Craig did not read Aristotle directly and instead lifted the 
citations from another author, in this case most probably Hotman but possibly Bodin. 
 
From there, the author cites Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus and their 
accounts of the decemvir Appius Claudius.222 This story is rather convoluted but, in 
summary, the decemvir Appius Claudius (451 BC) became infatuated with the plebeian 
maiden, Verginia. When she rejected his advances, he secretly ordered one of his clients 
to kidnap her under the pretext that she was a runaway slave. The Roman people, being 
aware of Verginia’s free status, demanded that the case be brought before the decemvirs 
for judgment. Appius Claudius heard the case and ruled that Verginia was the client’s 
slave whereupon the girl’s father, a celebrated centurion, stabbed her to death in the 
forum rather than see her enslaved. In the chaos that ensued, the dictatorship of the 
decemvirs was overthrown and the republic re-established. Thus, in the Roman 
tradition, the government’s political legitimacy is seen to derive from the justice of its 
rulings. 
 
The story was very well-known throughout antiquity and the Middle Ages and, 
indeed, is even mentioned in Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus. It is also mentioned in 
Buchanan’s De jure regni (pp.75-76); but, most importantly, it is found in the Digest 
(2.2.24), meaning it would have been known to any lawyer educated in the Civilian 
system, which includes not only Craig but most of his readers. That being so, it is 
significant that Craig should cite Dionysius and Livy instead of the legal text with 
which readers would be most familiar. This must represent another example of Craig 
attempting to advertise his humanist learning, his familiarity with literary texts beyond 
the purely legal. It is also interesting that the story of Appius Claudius holds up sexual 
wrongdoing and intemperate use of legal authority as a manifestation of personal 
wickedness, something that, as we said above, reflects both Buchanan’s view of the 
connection between sexual impropriety and tyranny and Livy’s belief that pleasure was 
innately corrupting.223 
 
                                                 
218 Nam bonos etiam viros licentia reddit deteriores. 
219 Qui legem volunt civitati dominari, hi videntur deum dominari velle; qui vero hominem, hi belluam 
praeficiunt. 
220 Aristotle, Politics 1.1253 (esp. a31). 
221 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.5. 
222 The 1732 edition cites Livy 3.4, 45 but 3.45-58 is more apposite. For Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the 
relevant source is Roman Antiquities 9. 28-32. 
223 Cf. Livy’s praefatio 4-12.  
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The story of written law then shifts into a discussion of values. Craig comments 
that the law ‘is a mind without selfishness’,224 a shield protecting magistrates from the 
duplicity of litigants and litigants from judgments given in error or from bias. Written 
law is one of the foundations upon which legitimate political authority is based because 
it ensures just and unbiased rulings. The final sentence of the section is simply a 
statement that ‘there was no republic, whether an aristocracy, in which the nobles ruled, 
or a democracy, in which the dregs ruled, in which the phenomenon of legal 
codification did not occur or evolve.’225 While superficially this is merely a remark on 
the universality of written law, it actually reveals that this section should be read as 
counterpoint and frame to George Buchanan’s contentions about written law, as I shall 
explain. 
 
Where Craig saw written law as a shield against injustice, Buchanan said it was 
‘like some obstinate and ignorant slave driver’.226 Craig saw written law as providing 
clearer guidance for judges, lawyers and litigants and clearer guidance necessarily 
amounted to greater justice. For Buchanan, more law meant more injustice.227 Written 
law was a conspiracy against what Cicero called ‘the supreme law’, the well-being of 
the people.228 Where Craig valued the impersonal nature of law and the absence of 
favouritism or bias which entails, Buchanan deplored it thus: 
 Before a king, there is the plea of weakness or rashness and the option of 
 pardoning someone taken in error. The law is deaf, inhuman and inexorable. 
 The young man blames the recklessness of youth, the woman the weakness of 
 her sex, another poverty, drunkenness or friendship. What does the law say to 
 these? ‘Go, lictor, bind his hands, cover his head, flog him and hang him from 
 that unhappy tree.’229 
Buchanan’s quotation is taken from a story in Livy where the father of Horatius attacks 
the law which requires his son’s execution.230 The rest of the text also borrows heavily 
from a part of Livy where arrogant young noblemen claim that the overthrow of the 
kings has reduced them to slavery because they can no longer do as they please while 
relying on royal friendship as protection from punishment;231 thus Buchanan slyly 
twists Livy’s words away from their natural meaning to suit his own ideological ends. 
 
                                                 
224 At lex est mens sine cupiditate. 
225 Nulla erat respublica, sive ea aristocratia, in qua optimates sive democratia, in qua faex popularis 
imperabat quae non inde occasionem legum condendarum aut arripuerat aut praetenderat. 
226 Est enim in legum imperio aliud incommodum. Lex enim, quasi pertinax et imperitus quispiam officii 
exactor, nihil rectum putat nisi quod ipsa jubet. (‘There is another disadvantage in the authority of laws. 
For law, like some obstinate and ignorant slave driver, thinks that nothing is right unless the law itself 
ordered it.’). Buchanan, De jure regni, p.61. The phrase quasi pertinax et imperitus...officii exactor seems 
to be a Latin re-working of a similar phrase from Plato’s Politikos, 294c (ὥσπερ τινὰ ἄνθρωπον αὐθάδη 
καὶ ἀμαθῆ - ‘like some stubborn and ignorant man’). 
227 Probas igitur vetus illud summa jus, summa iniuria. (‘You therefore agree with that old saying, the 
more law, the more injustice’). Buchanan, De jure regni, p.72. 
228 illa Ciceroniana lex sancta et inviolabilis esset, populi salus suprema lex esto. (‘that sacred and 
inviolable law of Cicero, let the good of the people be the supreme law’). Ibid. p.73. 
229 Apud regem vero infirmitatis et temeritatis est excusatio, et veniae in errore deprehenso locus. Lex 
surda, inhumana, inexorabilis est. Adolescens lubricum aetatis causatur, mulier infirmitatem sexus, alius 
paupertatem, ebrietatem, amicitiam. Quid ad haec lex? I, lictor, colliga manus, caput obnubito, 
verberato, arbori infelici suspendito. Ibid. p.61. 
230 Livy, 1.26.6-11; a part of the same formula is also to be found in Cicero’s Pro Rabirio 13. 
231 Livy, 2.3. 
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Craig’s remarks on the emergence of written law in aristocratic and democratic 
republics vaguely foreshadow the Basilikon Doron which railed against demagogues 
like Buchanan who aspired to become tribuni plebis in an ‘imagined Democracie’.232 
But, much more significantly, it shows Craig’s awareness of the paradoxical political 
space which Buchanan’s discourse occupied; although Buchanan is all too commonly 
presented as some kind of radical democrat based on his seeming hostility to monarchy, 
the reality is more complex. Buchanan dismissed the masses as a ‘many-headed 
monster’ to whom the running of the state could not be entrusted.233 So, while espousing 
popular sovereignty, he was clear that the nobles must exercise that sovereignty on 
behalf of the people.234 Even his attack on written law relies upon a passage from Livy 
in which noblemen attack fixed law on grounds that it takes no account of their social 
status and implicit right to do as they please without repercussions. Thus he espouses a 
discourse of power which legitimises political domination by the established élite 
(largely or wholly unrestrained by a monarchic counterweight). In his Rerum 
Scoticarum historia, the picture is more explicit: once more, for all his posturing about 
popular sovereignty, Buchanan’s ideal republic places power in the hands of the great 
noble families. Craig’s dismissal of both aristocracy and democracy shows that he had 
a very subtle understanding of Buchanan’s discourse, both tacit and articulated, even if 
his treatment of it is more terse than we might like. 
 
This terseness should not lead us to underestimate Buchanan’s importance as 
one part of the wider literary structure underpinning the Jus feudale. Buchanan’s 
ambition was, ultimately, for a polity in which royal power was constrained by nobles 
acting on behalf of popular sovereignty, for a state in which the king (paradoxically) 
was reduced to a mere judge, carrying out functions that had long since passed to other 
officeholders. Craig the feudist, though, founded his entire legal worldview upon the 
idea of the king as the font and origin of law, especially in the case of the feudal law 
since the king is, effectively, the ultimate feudal overlord holding a feu directly from 
God.235 Nowhere is this doctrine better expressed than in the Epistola nuncupatoria 
where Craig states that the feudal law is ‘the training ground for all customs and 
duties’,236 which are  
the most vital parts of the system, by whose defences your own god-given office 
is propped up, as if by supporting pillars, and is lifted up, as though by an 
outstretched hand, to a perfect understanding of law and equity; and nothing on 
earth is more pleasing or more gladdening to Almighty God whose breathing 
image on earth a king is.237  
                                                 
232 N. Rhodes, J. Richards and J. Marshall, eds., King James VI and I: selected writings, Aldershot, 2003, 
224. 
233 bellua multorum capitum. Buchanan, De jure regni, p.69. 
234 Cairns, Fergus & MacQueen, ‘Legal Humanism’, 57 state that ‘Buchanan attributes ultimate 
sovereignty to the people’ while also believing that ‘law should emerge from the rational deliberations 
of the politically responsible members of society’. On who was expected to exercise sovereignty, see 
Goodare, J., ‘The estates in the Scottish Parliament, 1286-1707’, 15 Parliamentary History (1996) 11-
32.  
235 JF 1.12.1. 
236 omnium morum et officiorum gymnasium. (p.vii of the 1732 edition). 
237 Haec sunt hujus disciplinae capita praecipua, cujus disciplinae praesidiis divina illa tua natura 
tanquam fulcris innixa et, quasi manu porrecta, allevabitur ad juris et aequitatis perfectam 
congnitionem; qua nihil in terris praestantius nihil Deo Optimo Maximo (cujus spirans imago rex in 
terris est) gratius. 
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The position of monarchy in this feudal world is laid out clearly when Craig says, ‘If 
the whole of Britain were cut into tiny pieces, there would be nothing which was not 
held in feu of Your Majesty (as we say in court) and nothing which did not owe you 
fealty’.238 And it must not be forgotten that Craig spoke as a unionist, as someone who 
saw in a united kingdom of Great Britain a solution to the age-old antagonism and 
warfare which had blighted the island. 
 
Thus, Buchanan’s philosophy is anathema to Craig’s entire conceptualisation of 
British law, politics and society. Nor is the conflict based around a simplistic model of 
democratic republicans versus tyrannical monarchists. Rather, as Craig is perfectly 
aware, Buchanan articulates an ideology which would invert the traditional flow of 
feudal obligations by subordinating the monarchy to the nobles. For Craig, this was a 
perversion of the feudal oath which he considered to be the foundation for civilised 
society.239 So, while this section curtly sweeps Buchanan’s argumentation aside 
without a serious engagement, readers must nevertheless be aware both of the depth of 
philosophical conflict between Craig and Buchanan (kinsmen though they were) and of 
how well-developed Craig’s vision of feudalism, and its place in society, actually 
was.240  
 
 
14. Jus feudale 1.1.13: the first lawgivers, Moses and Prometheus 
 
Having talked about the advantage of written law, Craig returns to his historical 
narrative and the question of who first set laws down in writing. He acknowledges 
Plutarch’s account which says that Prometheus first brought written law to the 
Egyptians, but this classical narrative is interwoven with biblical accounts as 
Prometheus becomes the son of Japheth, himself one of the three sons of Noah and the 
biblical ancestor of Europeans.241 He writes ‘A story is related, named the 
Prometheia,242 which says that when men were without wisdom, he brought down 
celestial fire from heaven in a fennel stalk,243 from which he enlightened the whole 
                                                 
238 Nam si tota Britannia in partes vel minutissimas secetur, nulla erit quae non in feudo de Maiestate 
Tua teneatur (ut in foro loqui solemus). 
239 Neque in societate civili ullum sanctius et certius vinculum est retinendae amicitiae vel benevolentiae 
quam hoc feudale sacramentum, quo alter alteri in omnibus, tam in pace quam bello, adesse ope et 
consilio tenetur. (‘Nor, in civilised society, is there any more sacred and certain restraint for the 
preservation of friendship and goodwill than the feudal oath, under which each is bound to supply the 
other with help and advice in all things, both in peace and in war.’) 
240 Craig’s wife, Helen Heriot, was the niece of George Buchanan’s mother, Agnes Heriot, and thus 
Buchanan’s cousin. 
241 Prometheus is also mentioned by Buchanan (De jure regni, p.178) although in a more conventional, 
classical reading that derives from Ovid (Odes, 1.16.13-16). 
242 The Prometheia is the name of a trilogy of plays by the tragedian Aeschylus (of which only 
Prometheus Bound, probably the first play, survives). Craig’s account, however, derives from Plutarch’s 
enormously influential Moralia which discusses Prometheus in two places: in the De Iside et Osiride, 
where he refers to the Egyptian belief that Prometheus was their ancestral giver of wisdom (Moralia 
5.26.3) and in the De fortuna (Moralia 2.8.3-5). Plutarch drew upon both Hesiod, the usual source for 
the Prometheus myth, and Aeschylus and actually quotes Prometheus Bound. 
243 In the myth, Prometheus hides the stolen fire inside a ferula (that is, the stalk of a giant fennel plant). 
Unfortunately the word ferula in Latin also means ‘cane’ and usually refers to a whip used to beat 
schoolboys (e.g. Juvenal, Satires, 6.479). The word appears to have confused Lord Clyde who excised it 
from his translation entirely. 
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human race’.244 This is followed by a reference to Plato calling law a deorum munus or 
gift from the gods and specifically attributing the origin of Cretan law to Jupiter and 
Spartan law to Apollo.245 However, ‘among all the secular authors too, it is absolutely 
settled that Moses was the first to furnish written laws’.246 
 
The secular authors under discussion are Diodorus, Justin, Josephus and ‘many 
others’ (plerique alii). Philo, meanwhile, is said to describe Moses as ‘the wisest 
lawgiver, most just prince and greatest prophet,..because he was the first who 
committed his laws to writing’.247 This remark recalls Craig’s De unione where Philo 
is cited as saying almost exactly the same thing: ‘Philo the Jew calls Moses the greatest 
king and holiest prophet and best legislator’.248 In both cases, Craig is presenting a 
paraphrase rather than a quotation and, again, in both cases his ultimate source was 
Bodin’s Methodus where Moses is described as ‘the most just and wisest prince’.249 It 
is likely that his knowledge of Josephus’ opinion of Moses is from the same source.250  
 
At this point, Craig challenges the standard reading of Moses as the first 
lawgiver arguing, instead, that God was the true lawgiver and Moses his clerk or 
secretary. The true importance of Moses was not in giving law but in setting law down 
in writing. While this is a valuable critical observation, it too ultimately derives from 
Bodin’s reading of Josephus rather than from independent interpretation on Craig’s 
part.251 More originality is found in his interpretation of Moses’ laws as wholly 
religious in nature and therefore sufficient only for the governance of the Israelites. 
Real law derived from the neighbouring states ‘which attended to earthly things...[and] 
thought many things were lacking in Moses’ country, things they considered beneficial 
for human society’.252 The limited influence of Israelite law, Craig says, was in part 
due to the fact that their legal texts were hidden away and ‘preserved in secret by the 
Levites’.253 So secretive were they that Juvenal described Jewish law as ‘Whatever 
Moses committed to his secret volume’,254 demonstrating that existence of Mosaic law 
was well-known but its contents were much more obscure. In reality, Juvenal seems to 
                                                 
244 Significantly, while Hesiod simply tells us that Prometheus stole fire from the gods, Aeschylus 
expands this and says that Prometheus taught humans all the civilised arts, such as writing, mathematics, 
agriculture and medicine. To this list, Craig adds law. 
245 Plato, Laws, 1.624a. 
246Ac inter omnes etiam profanos auctores certissimum est Mosen fuisse qui primus leges scriptas 
exhibuit. 
247 Philo enim prudentissimum legislatorem, justissimum principem et maximum prophetam 
asserit...quod primus is esset qui leges scripto commendavit. 
248 Philo Iudeus Mosen et regem maximum et prophetam sanctissimum et optimum legislatorem 
vocat.(p.14 of the 1909 Latin edition of De unione). Simpson, Thomas Craig,78 also notes this citation 
of Philo. 
249 Moses ipse iustissimus et sapientissimus princeps. Bodin, Methodus, p.182. 
250 Nam Josippus eo argumento colligit Mosem antiquissimum omnium fuisse legislatorem. Ibid. p.183. 
251 Iosephus, optimus antiquitatis interpres, Israelitarum originem ab ultimo principio repetens in libris 
adversus Appionem Grammaticum, docuit Mosem primum omnium mortalium leges scripsisse. 
(‘Josephus, the best interpreter of antiquity, recounting the origin of the Israelites from the very beginning 
in his book against the grammarian Apion, demonstrated that Moses was the first of all mortals to have 
written down the laws’.) Bodin, De republica, p.272; the text referred to is Josephus’ Contra Apionem, 
a defence of Judaism against the criticisms of Apion, an Alexandrian grammarian. 
252 Itaque vicinae respublicae quae res terrenas sectabantur...multa in Mosis republica abesse putabant 
quae ad humanam societatam curandam spectarent. 
253 Apud solos enim Levitas et eorum principem in occulto servabatur. 
254 Tradidit arcano quodcumque volumine Moyses. Juvenal, Satires, 14.102. In a satire about bad parents, 
this line is part of an attack on what Juvenal sees as Jewish separateness and secretiveness.  
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have had a decent knowledge of Judaic tradition but, for Craig’s purposes, the satirist’s 
account shows that Mosaic law too secretive to be useful and that non-Jewish law 
developed without the direct influence of Jewish legal culture.  
Craig’s approach to Mosaic law reveals some essential elements of his own 
legal worldview. He is less interested in law as a metaphysical abstraction than in the 
law as he met it in his daily life as a practitioner. By extension, this also says something 
about why Craig bothered to spend so much time discussing the origins of law and 
society; it is, for him, not a theoretical subject but an intrinsic part of understanding the 
history of practised law and a means by which he, as a humanist, could understand how 
the present state of affairs had come about. Further, Craig is impatient of the secretive 
nature of Mosaic law. He could not tolerate the idea that law should be hidden away 
from people; it had to be open, available to all, and written down so that it could be 
consulted. The secretiveness implicit in aspects of Jewish law (as interpreted by 
Juvenal) was, like the arbitrary royal justice espoused by Buchanan, anathema to 
Craig’s professional, ethical and philosophical sensibilities. 
Craig demonstrates this by going on to speak about the context in which the 
people began writing laws for themselves ‘because the leaders they had previously set 
to rule over them were not safeguarding fairness completely when they expounded the 
law’.255 So laws were born, as a defence against arbitrary judgments, ‘so that the strong 
should not be able to act with impunity’,256 (a line Craig borrows from Ovid)257  because 
‘all things were being oppressed by the force and licence of more powerful men’.258 
This, of course, brings the reader back to the original basis for society expounded at 
1.1.3; just as communities, and later states, were formed to protect the weak from strong 
outsiders, now law has been not only introduced but systematised and set down in a 
fixed and theoretically unalterable form to ensure the safety of the weak against 
powerful men within their community. 
Craig explains the need for this protection by saying that ‘strong men think they 
are entitled to everything’;259 he illustrates their behaviour by reference to Horace’s 
description of Achilles: ‘Energetic, angry, relentless, keen, let him spurn all laws, let 
him claim nothing but by force of arms’.260 In particular, Craig is talking about powerful 
men’s unwillingness to restrain their lust for other men’s wives; for, ‘the most frequent 
and foulest cause of murders and even wars was truly wandering Venus’.261 To be sure, 
Craig is placing a considerable amount of blame on women for their infidelity,262 but it 
would be a mistake to make that the focus of this section. ‘Wandering Venus’ has her 
part to play – and Craig is clearly speaking about the Trojan wars but also about, for 
example, the biblical murder of Bathsheba’s husband Uriah by David and, more 
topically, about Mary, Queen of Scots, who was widely portrayed as an adulteress – but 
his point here is about the powerful men, the viri fortes and potentiores, whose 
arrogance leads them to set aside the conventions of their community and take other 
                                                 
255 Cum viri principes, quos sibi praeesse antea jusserant, aequalitatem...omnino in jure dicendo non 
servarent. 
256 Ne fortior omnia posset. 
257 Ovid, Fasti, 3.279. The full line is inde datae leges, ne firmior omnia posset (‘Whence laws were 
given, so that the stronger should not be able to act with impunity’). 
258 Potentiorum enim armis et libidine omnia opprimebantur. 
259 Viri fortes omnia deberi sibi putabant. 
260 Impiger, iracundus, inexorabilis, acer,/ Iura noget sibi nata, nihil non arrogat armis. Horace, Ars 
Poetica, 121-122. 
261 Sed erat et alia etiam bellorum et caedium frequentissima causa et teterrima, nempe vaga Venus. 
262 Cf. Baird Smith, ‘Feudalist’, 282 on Craig as a ‘strong anti-feminist’ (or, as we would now say, 
misogynist). 
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men’s wives for themselves. Of course, this brings us back to the story of Abraham and 
Abimelech mentioned earlier where a powerful king did, in fact, respect social norms 
by releasing Sarah upon finding out she was married. It also takes us back to the story 
of Appius Claudius and, by extension, to the story of Tarquinius Superbus and the 
expulsion of the kings from Rome. It was to put an end to ‘these disgraceful lusts and 
oppressions, which were bringing about the certain ruin of the commonwealth’ that 
written laws were created.263 
 
 
15. Jus feudale 1.1.14: Lycurgus and Spartan law 
 
With this section, the narrative comes to classical Greece, a key cultural touchstone for 
Renaissance humanists. It opens by explaining that laws were enacted at an assembly 
of all the people of the community where opinions would be sought and, provided the 
majority acquiesced, the proposed law would be adopted as binding. It was, though, 
different in monarchies; there, a single distinguished leader would decide what was and 
was not law. Based on Craig’s earlier comments on the origins of monarchy (JF 1.1.8), 
it is clear that he is here distinguishing between the Asiatic and Hamitic monarchies, 
on the one hand, and the states of Europe on the other. 
 
Craig leads into his discussion of the Greeks by talking about the Egyptians. 
Ancient Greek and Roman admiration for and fascination with Egypt was widely 
expressed in the classical authors, so any Renaissance figure educated in the classical 
literary and mythological corpus would have been aware of Egypt’s influence on 
classical Europeans – the idea that Greece had a cultural debt to Pharaonic Egypt 
certainly did not originate with Martin Bernal and Black Athena! Thus, Egypt is a 
reasonably natural place to open a narrative of Graeco-Roman law. As we shall see in 
the next section, however, Craig has other motives for introducing Egypt to his 
discourse. 
 
Craig explains that Vechoreus IV wrote the first laws for the Egyptians and that, 
according to Diodorus, he reigned around the 3,077th year of the world, around the time 
that Carthage was founded. The name Vechoreus is a Latin attempt at transliterating 
the Greek Oukhoreos, the name given by Diodorus Siculus (50.3) for the founder of 
Memphis.264 The name can be found in a few other sources of the early modern and 
late Renaissance periods. Samuel Bochart’s Geographia Sacra employs it citing 
Diodorus as the source;265 Beyerlinck also employs the name in the Magnum theatrum 
and, although he does not specifically name his source, he calls Vechoreus ‘the king of 
Egypt who built Memphis’ which shows he was drawing upon Diodorus.266 In the 
Insular tradition, we can find the English transliteration ‘Uchoreus’ in Raleigh’s History 
of the World and, again, Diodorus appears to be the source.267 In a section that is 
essentially a narrative of ancient Greek law, Craig brings up Diodorus’ legendary 
lawgiver Vechoreus in order to locate Greece within a wider historical and cultural 
                                                 
263 Ut igitur his importunis libidinibus et oppressionibus, quae in certissimam reipublicae ruinam et 
praecipitium tendebat, modus imponeretur, leges latae sunt. 
264 Diodorus’ Oukhoreos appears under the name Menes in Herodotus 2.99. 
265 Samuel Bochart, Geographia Sacra, Caen, 1646, 1101-02. 
266 Laurentius Beyerlinck, Magnum theatrum humanae vitae, 8 vols., Lyons, 1665-1666, vol.7, 387 
(Urbes magnifice conditae). 
267 Raleigh, History of the World, 2.26.2 (p.514 in the 1614 London edition). 
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context but also because Craig understood law as just one step in a process of social 
evolution that seems to have been reached more or less simultaneously by most ancient 
societies. 
 
Thus, at the time Vechoreus was writing laws for the Egyptians, Craig has 
Lycurgus ruling the Spartans. He was considered to be the natural successor to his 
brother Eunomius and enjoyed widespread support but, upon learning that his late 
brother’s wife was carrying a child, he refused the title of king and instead governed as 
regent in the name of the unborn child, the future king Charilaus. Following the baby’s 
birth, Lycurgus continued as regent and enacted an extremely harsh legal regime. The 
citizens were unhappy so Lycurgus agreed to consult the Delphic oracle but extracted 
a collective promise that the laws would not be changed until he had returned. In the 
end, he never returned and arranged that even his bones would be burnt to ash and 
scattered so the Spartans would be left with no way of evading their oath. Much of this 
material appears to have been taken from Bodin’s Methodus;268 Bodin’s source, in turn, 
seems to have been Diodorus although, in places, it is possible that he was following 
Plutarch’s biography of Lycurgus. 
 
Sparta is sufficiently well-known in western culture not to need a great deal of 
introduction.269 It was a ‘militaristic society whose primary objective...was to foster a 
high degree of conformity and discipline in its citizenry’;270 labour and food production 
were carried out by helots, the slave-serf descendants of the Messenian people whom 
the Spartans had conquered in the late eighth century BC and the fact that these helots 
outnumbered the Spartans by a factor of at least seven-to-one probably explains a great 
deal about Sparta’s rather paranoid stratocracy.271 The laws which created the Spartan 
state and its brutal military culture were known as the laws of Lycurgus (or Lykourgos), 
a name which means ‘deed of the wolf’ or ‘wolf-worker’ and probably refers ultimately 
to a local wolf god who was in some way related to Apollo.272 The Lycurgan laws were 
famous for their rigidity and extreme conservatism; indeed, their antique and 
unchanging nature was a key element in Sparta’s self-image and national mythos.273. 
 
Having dispensed with introductory material, we return to the narrative. An 
overarching factor in Craig’s treatment of Sparta is, simply, that he was not a 
particularly accomplished Hellenist but borrowed heavily from Bodin who was.274 
Thus, Craig’s account is laden with a great deal of literary, symbolic and historical 
meaning that he was, in all likelihood, unequipped to understand. For example, it seems 
                                                 
268 Bodin, Methodus, p.169. 
269 The best general book on the development of law at Sparta is still the late Douglas MacDowell’s 
Spartan Law, Edinburgh, 1986, although since we have no written or epigraphic record of law at Sparta, 
we are wholly dependent on the literary product of non-Spartans, particularly Xenophon, Aristotle and 
Plutarch. 
270 R. Garland, Daily Life of the Ancient Greeks, Westport, Conn., 2009, 119. 
271 D. Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, London, 2005, 4; K. Kuiper, Ancient Greece: From the Archaic 
Period to the Death of Alexander the Great, New York, 2011, 40. 
272 Parts of the Spartan system do seem to have predated the Lycurgus myth; see P. R. Coleman-Norton, 
‘Socialism at Sparta’, The Greek Political Experiences: Studies in Honour of William Kelly Prentice, 
Princeton, 1941, 61-77 at 64. 
273 A. Powell, Athens and Sparta: Constructing Greek Political and Social history from 478 BC, 
London, 1988, 217. 
274 Bodin, of course, closely followed Aristotle (see, e.g., De republica, p.12, where he follows 
Aristotle in discussing the warlike constitutions of Crete and Sparta (and, somewhat incongruously, the 
Westphalian Anabaptists). 
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to have escaped his notice that the brother of Lycurgus was called Eunomius, which 
means ‘good law’ or ‘good order’ and happens to be the masculine form of Eunomia, 
the name often given to the Lycurgan legal system.275 Charilaus, meanwhile, translates 
to ‘favour of the people’. Thus, symbolically, we see the connection between Lycurgus’ 
law (‘the deed of the wolf’) and its relationship to good order and popular favour. Based 
on his critical response to biblical mythology, we can assume that if Craig had been 
aware of this, he would have acknowledged it in some way. In fact, and certainly by 
comparison with his treatment of the Bible, Craig seems to attach relatively little 
importance to the story of Spartan law. Where Bodin made Lycurgus an important part 
of his argument,276 Craig simply imports the information for the sake of completeness 
while providing little context and no commentary of his own. He does, however, 
mention Aristotle’s comments on them which, again, are taken from a contemporary 
source rather than directly from the original. 
 
Craig explains that Aristotle considered Spartan law to be immensely valuable 
but only in the military sphere. Since Lycurgus’ military obsession was inadequate for 
the proper governance of a state, the Spartans were forced to augment their constitution 
with new laws. He then cites the extreme spartophile Xenophon and his claim that 
Sparta was Greece’s supreme military power for seventy years because their laws ‘in 
addition to military discipline, encouraged frugality, temperance and contempt for 
wealth’,277 values which are the foundation for any good commonwealth.278 From this 
section alone, the careful reader can discern that Craig is largely ignorant of the primary 
sources and is, instead, relying on partial accounts (in both senses of the phrase) found 
in contemporary writers. For example, Craig is not aware that Aristotle’s treatment of 
the Spartan constitution is far from fulsome praise. The philosopher made serious 
criticisms of the helot system and of the seeming promiscuity, extravagance and poor 
discipline of Spartan women;279 Plato, in his Nomoi, prefigured Aristotle in 
condemning the inadequacy of Spartan law and its excessive focus on war.280 Plutarch, 
one of the other great sources on Sparta, condemned the corruptibility of Spartans.281 
In what could, perhaps, be a salutary lesson to modern students about over-reliance on 
secondary sources, Craig’s obliviousness to Sparta’s later military weakness and its 
terrible reputation for financial corruption show us that he has not looked directly at 
ancient writers but rather at Bodin’s treatment of them. This leads to a skewed and 
excessively upbeat account of Sparta exacerbated by the absence of useful critical 
commentary on Craig’s part. 
 
                                                 
275 J. Lazenby, The Spartan Army (Mechanicsburg, Penn., 2012, 92; cf. Coleman-Norton, ‘Socialism’ 63 
where it becomes ‘the famous code wherein posterity discerned the handiwork of Lycurgus the 
nomothete’ 
276 In particular, see Bodin De republica, pp.177-178. 
277 Nam praeter militarem disciplinam, frugalitatem, temperentiam et opum contemptum inducebant.  
278 Xenophon was inordinately fond of Sparta, even fighting for the Spartans against his home city of 
Athens at Coronea in 394 BC. Amongst other works, he wrote an account of the Spartan constitution and 
a biography of his friend, the Spartan king Agesilaus II. In the past, he was also often identified with ‘the 
Old Oligarch’, author of an anonymous and deeply critical account of the Athenian constitution, although 
this view is no longer current. 
279 Aristotle, Politika, 1269a-1270a; cf. Powell, Athens and Sparta, 246. 
280 See R. De Laix, ‘Aristotle’s Conception of the Spartan Constitution’, 12 Journal of the History of 
Philosophy (1974) 21-30. 
281 Plutarch, Lysander, 16-17. 
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Authorial dependence on Bodin is further illustrated in the next part of the 
narrative where he explains that Lycurgus refused to have his laws set down in writing 
calling them, instead, rhetrai,282 or ‘sayings’, because they were preserved through oral 
memorisation and recitation: ‘he was accustomed to remark that he was happier if his 
laws were not engraved on bronze tablets, as was the custom in other states, but in 
men’s minds’.283 It was not uncommon in the ancient world for civic laws to be 
inscribed on bronze plates,284 but Craig is actually taking all of this material directly 
from Bodin’s De republica.285 He does, in an apparent effort to advertise his learning, 
transliterate rhetrai into Greek letters where Bodin used Latin, but otherwise Craig is 
little more than a regurgitator of Bodin’s thoughts. This is perhaps the reason why Craig 
is so uncharacteristically supportive of unwritten law, claiming that, despite being 
unwritten, no laws were more enduring than those of Lycurgus. 
 
This section ends with a transition to Athens, what Craig calls ‘the other eye of 
Greece’ (alter Graeciae oculus), a reference to Justin where the Spartans refuse to 
destroy Athens because doing so would be to pluck out ‘one of the two eyes of 
Greece’.286 
 
 
16. Jus feudale 1.1.15: Draco, Solon and Athenian law 
 
In Athens, the first lawgiver was the infamous Draco whose laws were outrageously 
harsh: ‘Demades used to say (as told in Gellius) that the laws of Draco were written in 
blood, not ink, for he set one punishment for all crimes, namely death’ and Craig 
illustrates the point by stating that death was the penalty both for murder and for stealing 
vegetables from one’s neighbour.287 The reference here is to Noctes Atticae 11.18 
which treats the transition from the law of Draco to that of Solon.288 However 
Demades’s remark about blood and ink is not from Aulus Gellius at all but from 
Plutarch’s Life of Solon 17. This strongly suggests that Craig had access to neither 
Plutarch nor to the Noctes Atticae and was therefore drawing on (and perhaps mangling) 
a secondary source.  
 
Bodin’s De republica contains a comment that parricide and the theft of fruit 
were both punished by death;289 obviously, this is strikingly similar to Craig’s comment 
                                                 
282 Craig gives the Greek rhetras (ῥήτρας) the accusative plural form of rhetra. Generally rhetra is 
translated as ‘decree’ or ‘ordinance’, with the implication that they are spoken, but it also refers very 
specifically to the unwritten laws of Lycurgus. See Liddell and Scott s.v. ῥήτρα. 
283 Saepe enim se felicem praedicare solitus est si leges suae non tabulis aeneis, ut in aliis civitatibus 
fieri solebat, sed in animis hominum sculperentur. 
284 See Codex Theodosianus 12.5.2, 14.4.4 and 11.27.1. In general, see C. Williamson, ‘Monuments of 
Bronze: Roman Legal Documents on Bronze Tablets’, 6 Classical Antiquity (1987) 160-183. 
285 Bodin, De republica, p.241. 
286 Negaverunt se Spartani ex duobus Graeciae oculis alterum eruturos. Justin, 5.8. 
287 Demades dicere solebat (ut est apud Gellium) Draconis leges sanguine non atramento scriptas; unam 
enim omnibus delictis poenam nempe mortem constituit. 
288 The print editions cite the source as 12.18. This may reflect an error on Burnet’s part, repeated by 
later editors, but it more likely reflects the arrangement of the edition of the Noctes Atticae to which 
Craig (or Burnet) had access. Clyde excised the citation entirely from the 1934 translation. 
289 Draco, qui rogatus quamobrem pomi furtum morte perinde ut parricidium vindicaret, reposuit se 
graviores parricidae poenas illaturum fuisse, si poenam scisset morte graviorem. (‘Draco, who was 
asked how he could punish the theft of fruit with death in the same way as parricide, replied that he would 
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about murder and the theft of vegetables. However, neither Demades nor the remark 
about blood and ink are to be found in Bodin.290 While it was a common literary trope 
of the period to describe Draco’s laws as being written in blood and to attribute the 
observation to Demades, Craig specifically (and incorrectly) cites Aulus Gellius as the 
source. The safest interpretation is therefore to assume that Craig was drawing upon 
Bodin but elaborated his account with material from another unspecified contemporary 
source.  
 
The narrative next recounts how Solon was given authority to repeal Draco’s 
law and write new, more reasonable, ones. As with Lycurgus, the lawgiver demanded 
from the citizens an oath that his laws would not be repealed until he had returned to 
the city; he then departed for Cyprus where he lived until his death whereupon his bones 
were taken to Salamis and scattered in the fields so that the Athenians could never be 
absolved from their oath. Craig was aware this was effectively a duplication of the 
Lycurgus story,291 but the observation is not original and is again taken from Bodin.292 
We see in this dependence on the De republica the limits of Craig’s knowledge of 
ancient Greek primary sources. The recognition that the story of Solon’s burial on 
Salamis may be a rhetorical trope is interesting, not least because it illustrates the 
literary awareness of Bodin and thus of humanist culture in general, but it also shows a 
misunderstanding of wider political context. Solon was born on Salamis and the 
recovery of the island from Megara was a personal and political obsession of his.293  
The story can therefore be seen less as an attempt to maintain Solonic law than as a 
challenge to the Athenian polis to re-conquer the island. Bodin was either not aware of 
this or chose not to mention it in any of the places where he discusses Solon and 
Athens.294 Since Bodin did not mention it, Craig does not mention it. 
 
Craig continues the narrative by citing a story from Plutarch which says that 
Solon had visited Egypt and brought his laws from that place, ‘which means that Greece 
is indebted to the Egyptians not only for their philosophy but also for the science of 
political governance’.295 Here Craig adds some original and very important work of his 
own by stating that, since the Israelites bordered the Egyptians, it must have been the 
case that the Egyptian law was ultimately an imitation of Israelite law. ‘Thus the logic 
of all laws and governance ought to be attributed to God and His scribe, Moses, from 
whom even the most renowned of the ancients, drawing upon the fonts of law, led its 
brooks or springs to their own people.’296 As Greece received the science of law from 
Egypt, Egypt was in turn the recipient of Mosaic law. The translatio studii continues 
when Craig follows the traditional account that Rome’s Twelve Tables were founded 
                                                 
have inserted a more serious punishment for parricide if he had been aware of a punishment more serious 
than death.’) Bodin, De republica, p.765 
290 Demades is mentioned, in a completely different context, in the Methodus p.44 but, again, blood and 
ink are not to be found. 
291 De ejus morte idem commemorant quod de Lycurgo antea diximus. 
292 Bodin, De republica, p.427. 
293 Diogenes Laertius, 1.2. 
294 On Solon, see Bodin, Methodus, p.303 and De republica, pp.21, 56, 236, 427 and 555; on Athens 
generally, see De republica, pp.202, 694-696 and 699-700. 
295 Solonem in Aegyptum profectum et inde leges accepisse testatur Plutarchus, adeo ut non solum 
philosophiam suam, sed etiam reipublicae gubernandae rationem Graecia Aegyptiis debeat. 
296 Itaque omnium legum et reipublicae gubernandae ratio Deo et ejus amanuensi Mosi adscribenda, a 
quo etiam reliqui in suis rebuspublicis excellentisimi fontes juris haurientes ad suos ejus scaturigines 
sive rivulos deduxerant. 
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upon the laws of Solon.297 Thus, the Roman law which Craig had studied in France and 
which was utilised in Scotland had its ultimate antecedent neither in Rome nor Athens 
nor even in Egypt but in the Mosaic law of the ancient Israelites. This has significant 
implications for the rest of the Jus feudale.298 Yet, given Craig’s earlier observations 
about the deficiencies of Mosaic law, we must understand that the knowledge 
transferred from Moses was not that of law itself but rather the ratio of law and 
governance in the form of written law which was, in Craig’s eyes, the truest and must 
trustworthy form of law and one ultimately given to humanity by God. We have seen 
that humans, even wicked ones, could develop law and, indeed, had no option but to 
develop law if they wished their communities to function; yet written law was a gift 
from God, a gift which preserved justice from the whims of kings and judges by making 
law incorruptible and publicly available. 
 
Returning to Craig’s treatment of Sparta and Athens, it is singularly striking that 
there is no discussion whatsoever of the very peculiar legal and governmental 
arrangements of those states. The Spartan diarchy and ephorate, the Athenian ekklesia 
and Areopagus, are ignored despite Bodin actually discussing each of these at length. 
Given Craig’s concern, both in this chapter and throughout the Jus feudale, with the 
development and history of government,299 one would expect him to at least mention 
these unique institutions and their place in creating the laws of their respective cities. 
The only reasonable explanation, particularly given Craig’s difficulties with Greek and 
his (over-)reliance on contemporary, rather than ancient, sources, is that he lacked a 
general familiarity with the subject and its vocabulary and therefore had no confidence 
in his ability to discuss the subject usefully. Thus fearing that he had lost control of his 
material, he brought the narrative back to Moses. By contrast, when dealing with 
Roman or canon law, Craig is wholly confident and entirely in control of his material. 
 
17. Jus feudale 1.1.16: other states 
 
This section is the shortest in the chapter and seems to have been created by Baillie, the 
1732 editor, simply because it could not conveniently be attached to the previous 
section on Athens. It says only that various other states flourished in Greece and 
elsewhere and that they each had their own lawgivers; as examples, Craig cities Phaleas 
for Carthage, Hippodamus for the Miletus and Minos for Crete. He acknowledges the 
existence of others about whom he had not spoken and recommends that anyone 
seeking more information should read Aristotle. Phaleas and Hippodamus are both 
discussed in Book 2 of the Politics,300 but, more importantly, Phaleas was the lawgiver 
of Chalcedon, not of Carthage, although there were apparently some early humanists 
who thought otherwise.301. Quite clearly, Craig was, once more, relying on secondary 
literature rather than on the sources themselves; and, once more, it is informative that 
this occurs when the topic is ancient Greece and its literature. 
 
 
                                                 
297 JF 1.2.3 following Digest 1.2.2.4 and 1.2.10. 
298 I owe this profound and valuable observation on translatio studii from Moses to Scotland entirely to 
Prof. J. D. Ford. See also Ford, Law and Opinion, 214-215, 222-223, and 239-240. 
299 The study of institutions of law and government was, of course, one of legal humanism’s defining 
characteristics; Rodgers, ‘Humanism’, 129-130. 
300 The 1716 and 1732 editions, though, both cite Book 1 of the Politika here 
301 J. Gillies, Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics, London, 1797, 91, fn. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Unsurprisingly, Craig’s sources have long been a fruitful topic of discussion for 
scholars of Scottish legal history.302 The continental foundation upon which Craig built 
the first ‘real’ Scottish legal monograph is obviously interesting in its own right and 
valuable for understanding the legal processes, education and philosophy of early 
modern Scotland. Bodin’s influence on his thought has always been clear, not least 
because Craig himself often cites his name and refers his readers to Bodin’s work. What 
has, perhaps, been less clear is the sheer scale of Bodin’s influence on Craig’s 
interpretation of the earliest societies and the creation and evolution of the earliest legal 
systems. Bodin has traditionally been seen as a political, not legal, writer; indeed, Baird 
Smith went so far as to insist that Craig’s ‘exclusively legal mind’ could not 
comprehensively grasp Bodin’s political theories.303 
 
In reality, Craig’s mind was not ‘exclusively legal’ and the Jus feudale was 
never intended to be a narrow practick. Craig drew upon Bodin not, as Baird Smith 
said, because he wished to appropriate a political framework upon which he could 
overlay his own theories of feudal law but, rather, because he relied upon Bodin as his 
principal authority for understanding and analysing the genesis of human law and legal 
institution. Bodin was both the lens through which he understood legal prehistory and 
the authority he drew upon to support that understanding. Nor did Craig employ Bodin 
only in the ‘scene-setting’ chapters on the origins of law; like Buchanan, he borrowed 
Bodin’s theory of climate and,304 even in his discussions of substantive law, Bodin 
clearly had a significant influence on Craig’s thought.305 As Baird Smith had it a 
century ago, Bodin stands alongside Budé and Cujas as the scholarly and legal 
foundation upon which the Jus feudale was built.306  
 
This makes Craig seem profoundly dependent on his sources and, in a sense, 
such a characterisation would be accurate. The careful reader will often find wholesale 
borrowings from other legal writers.307 But, as we have seen, Craig is more than capable 
of taking a strikingly independent interpretational stance. The Jus feudale is a layered 
text, a particular blend of the historical, the philosophical and the legal, certainly given 
shape by the literature of classical antiquity and the Latin Renaissance but ultimately 
reflecting Craig’s vision and not merely that of his sources. His historiographical 
                                                 
302 E.g., Baird Smith, ‘Feudalist’, 294, n.1; Cairns, ‘Ius Civile’, 151ff; Cairns, Fergus & Mac Queen, 
‘Legal Humanism’, 50. 
303 Baird Smith, ibid. 
304JF 1.4.3; note that Craig’s references to Tacitus are taken directly from Bodin. For Buchanan, see De 
jure regni, p.8. 
305 Baird Smith, ‘Feudalist’, 286-287, emphasises (287) that Craig’s view of monarchy ‘follows closely 
on Bodin’, which is fine, as far as it goes, but may ignore the political and professional reality which 
Craig faced given that he was in the employ of a monarch, James VI, who was not wholly sympathetic 
to the idea of limited monarchy and who explicitly stated, in the Basilikon Doron, that rex in suo regno 
imperator est (cf. Jus Feudale, 1.12.5). See also Mason, Commonweal, 108 on the ‘crystallisation’ of 
absolutist monarchic ideology around the idea and theory of rex in suo regno… 
306 Baird Smith, ‘Feudalist’, 273-274 n.2 
307  For example, JF 1.14.11 and 1.9.9 quote more or less directly from Zasius’ Usus feudorum. Other 
instances can be found for almost any well-known feudist. 
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technique is defined, from the beginning of the work, by its rationality. Sources, 
religious and secular, are subjected to the same critical analysis. The fact that he 
sometimes draws upon sources at a remove – sources cited in another contemporary 
work – does not obviate this. Whatever the source, its account is explained and 
rationalised. 
 
Rationality defines Craig’s approach to history. His legal and societal aetiology 
is naturalistic and presents man as a rational social and political animal and civil life as 
the natural outcome of such human properties. The influence of Aristotle is patently 
obvious, though Craig probably had not read the philosopher directly and certainly not 
in Greek. Taught by French humanist professors who advanced the rational 
methodologies of the classical world and engaged in a career which was founded upon 
the underlying rational structures of Roman law, it is hard to see how Craig could have 
escaped the intellectual influences of the ancient world and its literary, historical and 
philosophical corpus. 
 
In this worldview, Craig’s worldview, history was not merely a series of past 
events and it was not to be studied for its own sake; rather history (and prehistory) 
constituted an explanation of how the present had come to be and allowed informed 
readers to analyse and understand the evolution and development of events and 
institutions. History was a diorama of the human experience and the rational man could 
extrapolate much from it. The first chapter, though ostensibly an aetiology of human 
law and society, is also a means by which Craig is able to approach important topics of 
the day. Hereditary monarchy, tyranny, the nature of kingship, slavery, personal liberty 
and the position of law in free and unfree societies are all discussed and these 
discussions are all, ultimately, about the Scotland in which Craig lived.308 
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308 Craig, of course, has much to say about English law and particularly about the commonalities 
between Scots and English law. One could call the Jus feudale a unionist text, in that it is concerned in 
a fundamental way with espousing the creation of a kingdom of Great Britain in consequence of the 
approaching union of the Scottish and English crowns. The present author’s view is that, though fair to 
characterise Craig as a unionist, the Jus feudale was, ultimately, a text about Scotland’s place within 
the universal system of feudal law. 
